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Abstract
This dissertation explores how aid a ects the probability of a conflict onset and
how a particular type of conflict, the phenomenon of political terrorism, can be stu-
died using network analysis. The general goal of this work is to add new layers of
analysis to the current literature, focusing in particular on new data. In fact, in the
first chapter of my thesis “Localized Aid and Internal Conflicts: the Case of Ugan-
da” I exploited new geo-localized data available through the geographic information
system (GIS). Given that the literature on conflicts demonstrates that civil conflicts
tend to be highly localized within a country and project-based aid are becoming one
of the main channels for donors, I examined the impact of foreign aid at a local level
on the probability of conflict onset. I will show that there is a positive link between
aid and the probability of a conflict onset, in particular for aid directed to sectors
classified as fungible, while there is no e ect on the persistence of the conflict. In
the second chapter of my thesis “Italian Terrorism: Network Analysis”, I proposed
the first original micro dataset on Italian terrorists’ socio-economic characteristics,
showing the sources and the procedure that I followed in order to construct the da-
tabase. I reconstructed the network of the Italian terrorist groups of all political
colours and I proposed an analysis using the concept of centrality in order to detect
characteristics that help an individual to reach a central position in this peculiar
setting. Results highlight the role of women and the importance of the trade-o 
which characterises those connections. In the final chapter, “Homophily in Terrorist
Networks ” I analysed the dataset created in the previous chapter in order to study
recruitment choices made by the Italian terrorist groups. By using the concept of
homophily, the goal of the work is to understand whether the recruitment policy of a
terrorist organization follows a strategic path. Results confirm a di erent behaviour
with respect to what the standard literature on social network suggests, which tends
to enlarge through time, reinforcing the idea that recruitment choices are not merely
based on political ideology but they are made considering strategic aspects.
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Chapter 1
Localized Aid and Internal Conflicts:
the Case of Uganda
Literature on conflicts demonstrates that civil conflicts tend to be highly localized
within a country. Literature on foreign aid highlights how project-based aid, which
are aid directed to specific locations, are becoming one of the most used way through
which governments and institutions help less developed countries. Taking into consid-
eration the importance of the localization of these phenomena, this article empirically
examines the impact of project-based aid on the conflict onset in Uganda using geo-
localized panel data from 2000 to 2013. The results show that in general aid has a
positive impact on the onset of a conflict at local level. Specifically, aid directed to
sectors that are classified as fungible from the literature have a positive impact, while
aid directed to sectors classified as non fungible have no impact. On the contrary,
the study of the e ect of aid on the persistence of a conflict at a local level shows an
absence of impact, neither in positive or negative direction.
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1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether and how foreign aid may a ect
the probability of conflict appearance in a territory, and more specifically to study
the impact of foreign aid on internal conflict (i.e. civil conflict) by using geolocalized
data, for the case of Uganda. Current literature typically analyses the topic from
a macro-perspective, by means of aggregate data at a country level, and produc-
ing inconclusive results. However, according to the existing databases (such as the
OECD’s Creditor Reporting System) a large amount of the project-based foreign aid
flows are directed to specific locations within the recipient country and this peculiar
form of aid are dramatically increasing in the last years. This work aims to fill the
gap in literature, dealing with the analysis from a micro-economic perspective. A
new data source, AidData 1, makes it possible to have a clear idea about the spread
of the aid in the country. By taking into consideration the importance of the e ects
at the sub-national level, this paper adds an information layer that can help to better
understand whether a direct impact of foreign aid on conflicts exists and, if so, in
which direction.
The main source of the data is the AidData portal, a platform established in 2009
through a partnership between three institutions (the College of William & Mary,
Development Gateway and Brigham Young University) whose aim was to create the
most comprehensive database by including information on aid projects of donors
that do not report to the OECD (such as Brazil, South Africa, and China) and
providing enhanced information on development projects and activities, in order to
improve transparency as well as donor and recipient strategic planning and coordi-
nation. The most important innovation of the portal is linked to the e ort given for
the geocoding, i.e. the tagging of projects and activities with precise geographical
information.
1AidData. 2015. Uganda AMP Geocoded Research Release Level1 v1.1 geocoded dataset.
Williamsburg, VA and Washington, http://aiddata.org/research-datasets.
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The choice of focusing on Uganda is due to three main characteristics. First of
all, the country is an underdeveloped country: according to World Bank, Uganda is
classified as a low income country given that its GNI per capita is lower than $10352.
Moreover, analysing data from the World Development Indicators, Uganda has been
one of the top 20 recipient countries (ranging from the 11th place in 2007 to the 20th
place in 2002) and the flow of aid represented almost 13% of the total GNI during the
period under analysis. Secondly, Uganda su ered for several internal conflicts since
Independence in 1962. According to ACLED database (Armed Conflicts Location
Event Data), between 1997 and 2013 the state had more than 4000 fighting events,
of which about a half with at least one death. Finally, the availability of data. The
most comprehensive geocoded aid dataset available at the moment is the Uganda
AMP Geocoded Dataset, whose latest release is July 2015. This dataset includes
information on 565 projects for a total of 2458 locations3.
In order to analyse this specific impact of foreign aid, it is important to clarify the def-
initions for all the core concepts used. This is a crucial aspect of the study. We have
to establish a clear definition of what a foreign aid, and in particular project-based
aid, is. Broadly speaking, in order to determine whether a flow can be considered as
international aid, it is applied the o cial definition given by the Development As-
sistance Committee of the OECD. It defines foreign aid as ”financial flows, technical
assistance, and commodities that are (1) designed to promote economic development
and welfare of developing countries as their main objective and that (2) is conces-
sional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent”. If the aid
is given for a specific purpose it is classified as “project-based aid”; otherwise, if it
covers a general sector for all the country, it is called “programme aid”.
2Uganda GNI per capita in 2013 is $550 according to the Atlas method.
3AidData released another interesting geocoded dataset in 2011 (REF) that covers the Sub-
Saharan African countries with conflict between 1989-2008, including only the conflict-years. For
this reason, this database is not useful for this work.
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The objective of the work is to understand if there are some evidences in favour
of (or possibly against) the idea that an increase in foreign aid towards a given area
increases the probability of a onset of a conflict in that specific area. If so, whether
the impact changes according to the type of foreign aid provided and if the presence
of aid can explain the duration of a conflict in a specific area. The e ect is not a
priori clear: theory shows that rebels can be regarded as specific type of business for
which aid can be seen as ”prizes” to be reached; on the other hand, aid can represent
a way for actually increase the standard of living of poor people and so decrease the
need of conflict.
The results show that the impact of Aid at a local level is positive. Once we
focus on the level of fungibility, the only type of aid that play a role are the one
classified as fungible (as suggested by the literature). On the contrary, when we
study the persistence of a conflict, the presence of aid seem not to play any type of
role, neither in reducing the number of years with conflict nor in increasing it.
1.2 Literature Review
The literature concerning the e ects of international aid on conflicts started at the
beginning of ’90s with a seminal paper of Grossman (1992) in which the author
analyses the allocative and distributive e ects of foreign aid within a theory of insur-
rections. The model is based on the idea that the objective of insurgents is to capture
the state, in order to achieve financial advantages. In this pattern, aid increases the
total financial amount of the State, increasing the incentives for rebellion. Follow-
ing the impulse given by Grossman, other authors tried to disentangle the linkage
between foreign assistance and conflicts with several important contributions, both
from the theoretical and empirical side, producing opposite results with no consensus
on the direction of the e ect.
14
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Few years after the first paper, another important contribution has been made
by Azam (1995) in which he developed a game-theoretic model that confirms the
previous approach. Aid represents a particular form of rents that increases the prob-
ability of conflict onset because it increases the prize of capturing the capital.
Apart from these theoretical contributions, some empirical work have been de-
veloped starting from the 2000’s, confirming the positive channel between the two
variables. The first important empirical paper in this direction is the one provided
by Addison and Murshed (2001) in which the authors sustain that the positive rela-
tionship between the two variables is mainly due to the volatility of aid flows, that
increases the uncertainty within the state and, consequently, increases the probabil-
ity of conflict.
More recent papers consider aid similar to natural resources, since in some cases aid
represents a lootable resource that can be exploited by the rebels. In particular,
Blouin and Pallage (2008) provide a simplified theoretical approach that shows how
the possibility to loot food aid can modify the choices of potential rebels. Their
approach is confirmed also by a recent empirical paper by Nunn and Qian (2014).
In their work, the authors focus on the e ect of U.S. food aid on conflict in recipient
countries, using changes in U.S. wheat production in order to assess the time vari-
ation in food aid shipments. They find that increases in food aid correspond to a
strong increase of the duration of civil conflicts and an increase on the onset of new
conflicts even if, in the latter case, the magnitude seems not to be really important.
Conversely, some papers a rm that international money can reduce the risk of
rebellions, improving stability and increasing the cost of conflict. In particular, for-
eign aid can be used for social purpose or to increase military expenditure, reducing
the incentive of rebellions against government. Collier and Ho er (2002) provide
an analytical and statistical analysis about the e ects of aid and economic policy
15
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on the risk of civil conflict. They suggest three main reasons for which flows of
international money can have a positive impact on the reduction of the incentive
for rebellions provided that growth (bullet 2) and less dependency (bullet 3) reduce
conflicts:
• A direct e ect on the economy by relaxing the government budget constraint.
According to their results, this e ect is the opposite of Grossman theory; as
the coe cient is negative. Actually, in their analysis this coe cient is not sig-
nificant but further studies, like the one made by Ree and Nillesen (2009), con-
firmed the negative impact, assessing that higher level of international money
alleviates the budget constraints and reduces the duration of a conflict (a struc-
tural increase in aid flows by 10% decreases the continuation probability by 8%
points);
• An indirect e ect through the economic growth. The authors sustain that,
conditional on policy, aid raises growth: an additional one dollar per capita
would raise the growth rate by around 0.25%;
• An indirect e ect through the diversification of the economy. In detail, the
authors find that aid create a significant “Dutch disease e ect”: aid reduces
primary commodity exports as a share of GDP, making the economy less de-
pendent.
The second point has been the most discussed since the beginning of the debate
on aid e ectiveness. The most recent study that attempts to clarify this point is the
one proposed by Santanu Chatterjee and Kaya (2012) in which the authors disen-
tangle the link between how the government spends the money and the composition
of foreign aid in order to find some indirect mechanisms through which aid a ects
growth.
In the last years, the debate concerning the topic has been enriched by a new
contribution, due to availability of a new type of data from 2011. In their paper
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of 2011, Michael Findley, Josh Powell, Daniel Strandow and Je  Tanner presented
a new database with detailed geographical information on foreign aid projects that
have been committed to some Sub-Saharian countries between 1989 and 2008. This
work represents the first e ort to address the problem in a micro-perspective, high-
lighting how the two main channels suggested by the literature (i.e., aid can stabilize
the economy of the recipient country but they can also increase the prize for captur-
ing the capital), can be better analyzed at a disaggregated level. Similarly, Berman
et al. (2013) compare the e ects of several development programs with di erent char-
acteristics provided during an important conflict, as the one occurred in Iraq. They
find that development spending is the most violence-reducing when they are small
and informed by experts. For the purposes of this study, the contribution by Tahir
(2017) who focuses on the case of Pakistan is fundamental. According to the author,
for the first time macro and micro data are combined to show that aid may not
reduce domestic conflict. Aid is regarded as easy money, weakening the government
incentive to use its own funds for reform and increasing the conflict risk in the country.
Finally, this study refers to the literature concerning Uganda. Several papers take
Uganda as unit of analysis, given the large number of ethnic groups that characterize
the region and the large number of internal conflicts registered also in recent years.
Several papers exploited the disruption of capital due to these violent episodes, fo-
cusing mainly on the consequences of battles on di erent individual characteristics.
The most comprehensive work in this sense is the one by Rohner et al. (2013) in
which, using individual and county-level data, they exploit the e ect of an ethnic
conflict occurred in northern Uganda between 2002 and 2005. The main result of
the paper is that battles had a strong and statistically significant negative impact
on trust towards other Ugandans4.
The study most similar to the one currently proposed is the working paper by
4Other studies that focus on the consequences of the conflict in Uganda are the ones of Deininger
2003 and Bozzoli et al. 2011
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D’Onofrio and Maggio (2015) who focus on Uganda in order to discover the socio-
economic e ects of foreign aid in developing countries. Using a similar disaggregated
data source for foreign aid, they find that individuals living in counties that received
more aid exhibit up to 13.3% higher probability to trust others with respect to those
living in counties with no aid.
1.3 Data
The empirical analysis uses annual data on Uganda from 1997 through 2013. Main
data for this study come from ACLED Version 5 and AidData 3.0.
1.3.1 Civil Conflicts
Data for the construction of the dependent variable is based on ACLED Dataset Ver-
sion 5 (Raleigh et al., 2010). This database covers political violence in Africa, from
January 1997 to December 2014. Each event is classified according to the rules “who,
what, where and when” in order to make the comparison between datasets easier.
Important information for this study concerns the type of conflict event (Battle with
no changes in territories; Battle in which non-state actor overtakes territory; Battle
where Government regains territory; Headquarters or base established; Non-violent
activity by a conflict actor and protests); the type of actors (governments, rebels,
militias, ethnic groups, active political organizations, and civilians) and the number
of fatalities for each event.
In the analysis, we used the structure of these data in order to construct di erent
specifications for the dependent variable. First of all, we constructed it in order
to catch the ”conflict onset” in the area: it is a binary indicator equal to one if a
conflict event is present at time t but not in time t-1 in a given district. Given that
the characteristic of this dataset is to include a large number of events, with a broad
definition of conflict; in order to avoid including some type of conflicts that from
18
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a theoretical point of view have no relationship with the independent variable, we
decided to limit the data to some particular type of events. In detail, one specification
is focused only on the conflicts that register at least one fatality; while a second one
is focused only to events whose actors are civilians and not organized group. Ex ante,
we can sustain that the e ect should be more significant in the latter case given that
the theoretical link should be closer.
1.3.2 Foreign Aid
AidData is a platform established in 2009 by a partnership between College of
William & Mary, Development Gateway and Brigham Young University that in-
tegrates detailed project-level data on $6 trillion in aid from over 90 agencies with
information on remittances and foreign direct investment. For the purposes of this
study, it is important to highlight the e ort made in an initiative aimed to geocode
projects (applying precise geographic coordinates to development activities), that led
to the release of some country-specific geocoded datasets as, for example, the one
concerning Uganda at the end of 2014. In order to have a better micro information,
AidData implemented an information management system, called Aid Management
Platform (AMP), at country-level. The goal of this project is to enable governments
to better manage external aid in accordance with national development priorities.
In general, donors report development finance information to partner governments
through an Aid Information Management System (AIMS). Currently, thanks to Aid-
Data Research Assistants, all the projects with geographical information are coded.
In particular, the Ugandian dataset includes aid allocation measured in constant
U.S. dollars, covering the years 1978 through 2014 and including information on 565
geocoded projects implemented by 37 donors, for a total of 2470 locations. Figure 1.1
shows the distribution of projects among donors. Even if this is the most complete
database available, some weaknesses have to be highlighted. First of all, analyzing
the structure of the data little information is available for projects before 1997, i.e.
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Figure 1.1: Donors distribution
there is an high probability of missing data before 1997. For this reason we decided
to focus only on the period ranging from 1997 to 2013. Moreover, no assumption
is made about how the financial amounts are divided when a transaction has more
than one location: in the data only the total amount for each project is present.
In order to disentangle the problem, we decided to use the number of people living in
the district as criteria. The only exceptions are the aid in agriculture and water and
environment for which the criteria was the area of the district itself. It is important
to highlight that the data does not contain precise information on the percentage of
loans and grants for each project; the only information we know is that almost 25%
of the total is in the form of grant, given the o cial definition of foreign aid.
The system of geo-referencing used is based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s
Geo-referenced Events Dataset (Sundberg et al., 2010), with some slightly adapta-
20
Chapter 1. Localized Aid and Internal Conflicts
Figure 1.2: Distribution of geo-codes
tion and additional rules in order to better evaluate the location of the projects5. In
appendix the detail of the geocoding is presented.
Figure 1.2 presents the dataset by precision code. Notice that the majority of the
locations are coded at precision code 3 (54,11%), that corresponds to a district level
in Uganda (they are 112), reinforcing the decision to take as unit of analysis the
district-level. Aggregating the first three columns, the 87,97% of the observations
are taken into account, a percentage that allows us to have interesting predictions
and results.
In the analysis, the independent variable would be the amount of aid disbursed in
5See Strandow et al. (2011) for more detailed information.
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a district each year over the district total population of the same year. It is possible
to include this last variable thanks to the presence of district population in the census
of 1991, 2002 and 2014. By interpolating such data, we are able to have a credible
reconstruction of the population in each district for each year.
1.3.3 Controls
To have a global view of the problem, other explanatory variables need to be taken
into consideration. First of all a variable representing the income is taken into con-
sideration. This is due in order to capture some important local income di erences.
Unfortunately, disaggregated data for developing countries are not available but, fol-
lowing the literature, we uses average night light intensity as a proxy for the income
for each district.
Some geographic controls are included (like mean elevation, total district area
and the presence of natural resources in the district, in order to consider the pos-
sibility of the presence of lootable resources). Moreover, following the suggestions
given by Findley et al. (2011), also the distance of the district to the capital and to
the borders is included in the analysis.
One of the characteristic of Uganda is the large number of ethnic groups in the
area. According to Rohner et al. (2013) more than 50 di erent fractions cohabit in
the region. Thanks to the Geo-referencing of Ethinc Groups project (GREG Wei-
dmann et al. (2010)) we are able to determine the ethnic fractionalization in each
district.
Finally, some district-level controls like average age, average level of education
and urbanization rate are used in the analysis. These data are available from the
Census of Uganda Bureau of Statistics of 2014.
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1.4 Preliminary Analysis
In order to deepen our understanding of the data, some preliminary analysis are
fundamental.
Figure 1.3 shows the sectoral division of the projects among 11 di erent sectors.
This information is fundamental for this study, enabling us to take into consideration
the possibility of di erent e ects according to the fungibility of aid. In fact, the liter-
ature distinguishes between the so called “fungible aid” and “non-fungible aid”. The
former class includes all the money for which is easier to divert to activities di erent
from the original purpose, obtaining as result a di erent net e ect with respect to the
one intended. In particular, rather than increasing the government spending, this
money is used to substitute the government spending. The latter class represents
the aid in sector for which literature suggests that government tend to use them for
the original purpose.
According to Findley et al. (2011) fungible aid are more attractive to rebels with
respect to the other category because they increase the potential returns to obtaining
the reins of power.
Given that literature has identified sectors for which the level of fungibility is high
and others for which fungibility is not an issue (Feyzoglu et al., 1998), we provide the
sector division proposed in figure 1.3 and we divide our sample in two di erent order
of fungibility: the so called ”Non-fungible aid” represented by aid destined to health,
information and communication, social development and works & transport and the
”Fungible aid” that are money provided to accountability, budget support, energy
and mineral development and water,agriculture, education, public sector manage-
ment and environment.
The largest number of projects is implemented by Japan (90), followed by Euro-
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Figure 1.3: Aid flows by sector
pean Union and United Kingdom. In general, 27.33% of projects are promoted by
multilateral donors while the rest (72.67%) are by bilateral ones.
To get a better idea about the relationship between international money and con-
flicts, we plotted both variables using ArcGIS. The output is represented in figure 1.4.
From the map it seems that the two variables follow two di erent patterns: except
for the capital that seems to attract both variables, in the rest of the country the
two events seem to be di erently located. In particular the largest part of conflicts
are concentrated in the north of the country, while the largest number of projects
are located in the south-east and along the borders.
Even though this map gives us an initial idea about the connection between
the two phenomena, it may be more interesting to look at the average amount of
per capita aid instead of the number of projects. Figure 1.5 shows this situation,
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Figure 1.4: General map
with data aggregated at district level. The map on the left shows the amount of
aid received by each district, while the map on the right aggregates the number of
conflicts occurred in each unit of analysis. With respect to the previous analysis,
some similarities seem to emerge: in both cases there is a high concentration around
the capital, in the south of the country; moreover conflicts are strongly concentrated
in the northern part of the country, as suggested before. Indeed, looking at the
amount of aid instead of the number of projects, we notice that the large amount
of projects located in the south-east are probably less important, from an economic
point of view, than the ones in the north-west.
Finally, checking year by year it is possible to highlight some interesting fea-
tures. According to Figure 1.6 it is easy to see how the number of conflicts remains
practically constant for all the period taken into consideration, both looking at the
general definition or shrinking the data only to conflict with fatalities. On the other
hand, the number of districts that received an amount of international aid is greatly
increased, starting from 16 districts in 1997 to all the administrative regions in 2009.
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Figure 1.5: Aid flow and number of conflict per district
Taking the whole sample, 63.6% of districts received international assistance dur-
ing the period under analysis, while 32.2% su ered of almost one conflict; this per-
centage drops to 20.3% if we consider only conflicts with at least one fatality.
1.5 Methodology and Results
As pointed out in the introduction of this work, in order to make consistent estima-
tion, it is important to take into consideration the main problem that a ects this
topic: reverse causality. This problem a ects estimations in directions that are am-
biguous ex ante. In fact, on one hand, some of the existing literature on the topic
assesses that conflicts arise where there are more aid, but it is also possible that aid
are allocated where there is higher probability of conflict onset. On the contrary, it
is also plausible that conflicts arise where there are less aid and that aid tends to be
allocated in stable areas.
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Figure 1.6: Numerosity
To take into consideration this aspect, the existing literature suggests the use
of lagged aid flows data in order to solve the problem. The reason is that it seems
reasonably di cult that donors are able to anticipate the arise of a conflict before the
e ective onset (Ree and Nillesen, 2009; Findley et al., 2011). This is the approach
that we used in this work.
In order to explore in a better way the data, given that the first years of these
datasets are not totally reliable, we decided to drop all the data before 2000; reducing
our time span to 13 years, from 2000 to 2013.
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Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Aid per capita 1564 3.4002 13.93 0 288.084
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics aid per capita
1.5.1 Conflict Onset
We decided to use two di erent definitions of the dependent variable. For each
definition we run a standard logit regression and the general model is:
Conflictd,t = [—0+ —1Aidpcd,t≠1+ —2lightsd,t≠1+ “1Gd+ “2Ed+ “3Dd+ ÷t+ ‘d,t]
where Aidpcd,t≠1 is the main variable that represents the amount of aid per capita,
which is constructed as the total amount of aid over the total population of a given
district d; while lightsd,t≠1 represents a proxy for the income. This variable is lagged
of one period, in order to avoid a potential problem of reverse causality: the presence
of a conflict in that district could reduce infrastructures, and so the amount of lights
registered by the satellite could be potentially smaller. Gd represents the geographic
controls (namely total district area, mean elevation, distance to capital and borders);
Ed the Ethnic fragmentation based on the GRID project; Dd the demographic con-
trols and ÷t are time dummies.
Figure 1.7 presents the distribution of the main variable of interest and Table 1.1
the descriptive statistics 6.
The first strategy concerns the use of the general definition given by the Acled
dataset (i.e. the entire sample) in order to catch the probability of a conflict onset.
6Given the presence of two important outlier in our sample, we decided to exclude them from
the analysis.
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Figure 1.7: Aid per capita distribution
In details, the dependent variable is defined as follows:
Pr(Conflictd,t = 1) =
Y_]_[1 if conflict is present in t and not in t≠ 10 otherwise
Where d represents the district.
Table 1.2 summarizes the results.
According to these results, the main variable of interest is positive and signifi-
cant in all the specifications. In fact in the first column, in which the regression is
done without any control, the result suggests that an increase of 1 dollar per capita
increases the probability of the conflict onset in the following year of 0.0018; which
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aidt≠1 0.00183** 0.00180** 0.00182** 0.00142** 0.00131**
(0.00072) (0.00071) (0.00072) (0.00065) (0.00063)
Lightst≠1 -0.0071 -0.0078 -0.0076 -0.0073 -0.0104
(0.0059) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.011)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0173
(0.0215)
Conflictt≠3 0.0515**
(0.0206)
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethnic Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.2: Logit specification on general events
means an increase probability of 0.18%. This result is substantially constant in all
the specifications, even if the magnitude tends slightly to decrease.
Column 4 presents the result of the specification with both geographic and eth-
nic controls as well as time dummies: the main variable of interest stays positive,
suggesting an increase probability of conflict onset of 0.14%.
In order to have a complete picture it can be important to take into considera-
tion the persistence of a conflict in a given district. For this reason, we decided to
run an additional regression, adding as explanatory variables also two variables that
capture the presence of a conflict in a given district respectively two and three years
before the year under analysis.
Results are presented in column 5 and the coe cients are not really di erent with
respect what we found in the previous regression. In fact, also in this specification
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the main variable of interest is positive, with a magnitude of 0.0013.
Referring to the two new variables, only the presence of a conflict three years
before the time taken into consideration seems to be significant at a 5% level. The
impact is positive and important, suggesting that the presence of a conflict three
years before, increase the probability of the onset of a new conflict of 5%.
In order to study the phenomena, a di erent definition of the dependent variable
can be studied.
Given that the goal of aid is to help civilians, Table 1.3 presents the results
limiting the dependent variable to events that involved civilians as actor.
Civilsd,t =
Y_]_[1 if conflict with civilians as actors is present in t and not in t≠ 10 otherwise
The results of this specification are substantially in line with what we found in
the previous definition, with a slightly smaller magnitude. In fact, focusing on the
forth column which represents the analysis with all the controls, it suggests that an
increase of 1 dollar per capita increases the probability of the conflict onset in the
following year of 0.0012; which means an increase probability of 0.12%.
The last column represents the specification which take into consideration also the
presence of a conflict with civilians involved respectively two and three year previous
the year of the analysis. While the magnitude of the main variable is substantially
confirmed, it is interesting to highlight how in this specification none of the conflict
variables play a role. In fact neither the variable concerning the presence of the con-
flict with civilians involved two years before nor the one capturing the presence of
a conflict with civilians three years before is significant, suggesting that this specific
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aidt≠1 0.00154** 0.00154** 0.00155** 0.00119** 0.00111**
(0.00064) (0.00061) (0.00062) (0.00056) (0.00055)
Lightst≠1 -0.00516 -0.00459 -0.00457 -0.00433 -0.00627
(0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0068)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0055
(0.0214)
Conflictt≠3 0.0263
(0.0207)
Geografic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethinc Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.3: Logit specification on events with civilians involved
type of conflicts are more prone to be made for specific objectives and not for long
term goals.
1.5.2 Conflict Onset - Classification According to Fungibility
Because of the di erent nature of aid, we decided to study if there is a di erent
impact of aid based on their fungibility. Table 1.4 presents the descriptive statistics
of this classification.
We followed the same line of reasoning of the previous point, running a similar
type of model, in di erent versions.
The first specification concerns the study of the impact of the so called non-fungible
aid. It includes sectors for which the literature suggests that the possibility that aid
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Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fungible 1564 2.1108 11.7488 0 277.781
Non fungible 1564 1.2894 6.9146 0 192.994
Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics aid per capita classified according to their fungibility
is used in ways not intended by donors when disbursing the funds is small.
The general model is:
Conflictd,t = [—0+ —1NFaidd,t≠1+ —4lightsd,t≠1+ “1Gd+ “2Ed+ “3Dd+ ÷t+ ‘d,t]
where NFaidd,t≠1 represents the total amount of aid per capita classified as non
fungible and it is calculated as non fungible aid over the total population of a given
district d; lightsd,t≠1 represents a proxy for the income: as before, this variable is
lagged of one period, in order to avoid a potential problem of reverse causality.
Table 1.5 summarizes the results, taking as dependent variable the onset of a
conflict with the most general definition.
The results are in line with what we expected: in all the versions of the model
the main variable of interest is not significant, suggesting that project aid which
are addressed to sectors in which there is more possibility of control from the donor
countries have no impact on the probability of conflict onset.
33
Chapter 1. Localized Aid and Internal Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NonFungibleAidt≠1 0.00013 0.00027 0.00046 -0.00025 -0.00015
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Lightst≠1 -0.00592 -0.00653 -0.00640 -0.00614 -0.00874
(0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0092)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0156
(0.0215)
Conflictt≠3 0.0525**
(0.0207)
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethnic Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: Logit specification on general events - non fungible aid
Similarly, we provided a second specification focusing only on the so called fun-
gible aid.
The general model is:
Conflictd,t = [—0+ —1Faidd,t≠1+ —4lightsd,t≠1+ “1Gd+ “2Ed+ “3Dd+ ÷t+ ‘d,t]
where Faidd,t≠1 represents the total amount of aid per capita classified as fun-
gible and it is calculated as fungible aid over the total population of a given district d.
Table 1.6 summarizes the results.
The results suggest that aid provided to sector in which the control of the donor
is more di cult have a positive impact on the probability of conflict onset in that
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FungibleAidt≠1 0.00211** 0.00204** 0.00203** 0.00160** 0.00147**
(0.00084) (0.00082) (0.00083) (0.00072) (0.00070)
Lightst≠1 -0.00657 -0.00712 -0.00689 -0.00675 -0.00941
(0.0057) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0098)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0179
(0.0215)
Conflictt≠3 0.0515**
(0.0206)
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethnic Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.6: Logit specification on general events - fungible aid
specific location. In fact, in all the specification the main variable of interest is pos-
itive and significant, ranging from 0.0021 of the first specification to 0.0016 of the
forth. This means that an increase of 1 dollar per capita of aid in sectors classified
as fungible implies an increased probability of onset of a conflict of 0.16%.
Once we control also for the presence of previous conflict in the district the coef-
ficient slightly reduces but it is still positive and significant (0.0015).
A final version in which both elements are in the model is presented in Table 1.7.
According to the theory, the impact of the so called ”non fungible aid” should be
lower with respect to the one classified as ”fungible”. The results are in line with the
literature. In fact, the variable representing the sectors which has been classified as
”non fungible” results not significant in any of the specifications; while the variable
35
Chapter 1. Localized Aid and Internal Conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NonFungibleAidt≠1 -7.41e-06 0.00015 0.00035 -0.00026 -0.00014
(0.00234) (0.00231) (0.00230) (0.00229) (0.00219)
FungibleAidt≠1 0.00211** 0.00204** 0.00203** 0.00160** 0.00147**
(0.00084) (0.00082) (0.00083) (0.00072) (0.00070)
Lightst≠1 -0.00657 -0.00717 -0.00702 -0.00666 -0.00932
(0.0058) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0093)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0179
(0.0215)
Conflictt≠3 0.0515**
(0.0206)
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethnic Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.7: Logit specification on general events - fungible and non fungible aid
representing the ones classified as ”fungible” is positive and significant in all the ver-
sions of the regression.
Notice that the magnitude of the variable Fungible is confirmed in this version of
the model: an increase of 1 dollar per capita of aid in sectors classified as fungible im-
plies an increased probability of onset of a conflict which ranges from 0.21% to 0,15%.
As before, the same models are provided with a di erent definition for the de-
pendent variable which focuses only on events that involved civilians as actors.
Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 show respectively the three di erent specifications of the
model taking as main independent variables non fungible aid, fungible aid and both
respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NonFungibleAidt≠1 0.00026 0.00047 0.00050 -0.00018 -0.00011
(0.00216) (0.00214) (0.00214) (0.00214) (0.00206)
Lightst≠1 -0.00430 -0.00380 -0.00379 -0.00358 -0.00534
(0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0063)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0046
(0.0215)
Conflictt≠3 0.0271
(0.0208)
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethnic Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
ú ú ú p<0.01, úú p<0.05, ú p<0.1
Table 1.8: Logit specification on conflict with civilians - non fungible aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FungibleAidt≠1 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0013** 0.0012**
(0.00071) (0.00068) (0.00068) (0.00060) (0.00059)
Lightst≠1 -0.0047 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0058
(0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0065)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0053
(0.0214)
Conflictt≠3 0.0265
(0.0207)
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethnic Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
ú ú ú p<0.01, úú p<0.05, ú p<0.1
Table 1.9: Logit specification on conflict with civilians - fungible aid
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NonFungibleAidt≠1 0.00016 0.00037 0.00039 -0.00019 -0.00011
(0.00218) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00216) (0.00208)
FungibleAidt≠1 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0013** 0.0012**
(0.00071) (0.00068) (0.00068) (0.00060) (0.00059)
Lightst≠1 -0.0048 -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0039 -0.0057
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0065)
Conflictt≠2 -0.0053
(0.0215)
Conflictt≠3 0.0265
(0.0207)
Geographic Controls no yes yes yes yes
Ethnic Controls no no yes yes yes
Year dummies no no no yes yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1450 1224
Standard errors in parentheses
ú ú ú p<0.01, úú p<0.05, ú p<0.1
Table 1.10: Logit specification on conflict with civilians - fungible and non fungible
aid
The results are in line with what we expected, with an higher e ect of fungible
aid with respect to the non fungible ones. Notice that di erently to the previous
definition, the magnitude is smaller: an increase of 1 dollar per capita in aid in
sector classified as fungible implies an increase of the probability of conflict onset
which ranges from 0.17% to 0.12% according to the specification.
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1.5.3 Persistence of Conflict
The goal of this section is to understand if foreign aid has some impact on the
duration of a conflict in a given area and, if so, to determine the magnitude. As
before, we decided to use two di erent definitions of the dependent variable, running
a fixed e ect model. The general regression is:
Durationd,t = —0+ —1Aidpcd,t≠1+ —2lightsd,t≠1+ “1Gd+ “2Dd+ ÷1t+ ÷2d+ ‘d,t
where Durationd,t is the consecutive number of years in which at least one con-
flict was present in the district; Aidpcd,t≠1 is the main variable that represents the
total amount of aid per capita; while lightsd,t≠1 represents a proxy for the income.
Gd represent the geographic controls; Dd the demographic controls, ÷1t and ÷2i
represents time and district fixed e ects respectively. Table 1.11 presents the results.
As is evident from the table, the coe cient of the project-based aid is non statis-
tically significant in all the versions of the model. This suggests that the presence of
aid does not seem to have an impact on the duration of a conflict neither in reducing
it nor in augmenting it.
Notice that, di erently from all the previous analysis, the variable representing a
proxy for income is strongly significant with an important magnitude. This suggests
that once a conflict arises in an area with an higher level of income, the persistence
of such a conflict is stronger with respect to an area with few resources.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aidt≠1 -0.0022 0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0046
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Lightst≠1 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.211*** 0.313***
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0842)
Constant 0.514 0.807 0.401 0.785***
(0.618) (0.671) (0.681) (0.0570)
Geographic Controls yes yes yes no
Year dummies no yes yes no
Fixed e ects no no no yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1224
Number of Id 112 112 112 112
Standard errors in parentheses
ú ú ú p<0.01, úú p<0.05, ú p<0.1
Table 1.11: Duration of a conflict
Following the same line of reasoning of the previous section, we present the same
analysis focusing on the fungibility of the project-based aid (Tables 1.12,1.13 and
1.14).
As expected all the results are confirmed, with no impact of any of the variable
of interest and the confirmation of the positive impact of the income proxy.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonfungibleaidt≠1 -0.0055 -0.0058 -0.0019 -0.0113
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0111)
Lightst≠1 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.212*** 0.309***
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0820) (0.0841)
Constant 0.506 0.802 0.404 0.785***
(0.625) (0.680) (0.690) (0.0573)
Geographic Controls yes yes yes no
Year dummies no yes yes no
Fixed e ects no no no yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1224
Number of Id 112 112 112 112
Standard errors in parentheses
ú ú ú p<0.01, úú p<0.05, ú p<0.1
Table 1.12: Duration of a conflict - non fungible aid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fungibleaidt≠1 -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0010 -0.0036
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Lightst≠1 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.212*** 0.311***
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0842)
Constant 0.510 0.801 0.400 0.779***
(0.624) (0.677) (0.687) (0.0565)
Geographic Controls yes yes yes no
Year dummies no yes yes no
Fixed e ects no no no yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1224
Number of Id 112 112 112 112
Standard errors in parentheses
ú ú ú p<0.01, úú p<0.05, ú p<0.1
Table 1.13: Duration of a conflict - fungible aid
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonfungibleaidt≠1 -0.0053 -0.0057 -0.0017 -0.0112
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0111)
Fungibleaidt≠1 -0.0018 -0.0017 0.0010 -0.0036
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Lightst≠1 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.212*** 0.312***
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0842)
Constant 0.515 0.810 0.401 0.790***
(0.620) (0.674) (0.684) (0.0576)
Geographic Controls yes yes yes no
Year dummies no yes yes no
Fixed e ects no no no yes
Observations 1450 1450 1450 1224
Number of Id 112 112 112 112
Standard errors in parentheses
ú ú ú p<0.01, úú p<0.05, ú p<0.1
Table 1.14: Duration of a conflict - fungible and non fungible aid
1.6 Conclusion
The quantitative literature on civil conflict and aid has mainly relied on a macro-
perspective, ignoring one of the main characteristics of conflicts which is the con-
centration of the phenomena in specific portion of the country and not the entire
territory and founding no-consensus on the e ect. Moreover, in this last years, the
importance of the so called ”project-based aid” is strongly increasing, representing
one of the most important channels through which institutions and governments
work.
In this paper we presented a first attempt of overcoming these issues by propos-
ing a first approach based on geo-localized data. The use of specific datasets and
new tools let us to study the specific characteristics of the country and to focus on
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specific location instead of the whole country. The main results suggest a positive
impact of this specific type of aid on the conflict onset but not on the permanence
of the conflict itself.
The specificity of the project aid let us to distinguish also according the level
of fungibility of each project, based on the sector to which the plan is addressed.
This analysis confirms that the fungible aid are the ones that have some positive
impact on the conflict onset. As a result, these founding confirm the higher possibil-
ity from rebel groups and civilians to appropriate of aid directed to accountability,
budget support, energy and mineral development, agriculture, education, public sec-
tor management, environment and water and environment with respect to the ones
directed to sectors like health, social development and work and transport.
This work represents a first step for future research on this topic, adding a new
layer that is important to take into consideration. The direction on which this work
could be expanded are several: first of all the use of an IV approach could over-
come the problem of reverse causality in a di erent way, but the few amount of data
available for underdeveloped countries makes this approach di cult to implement.
Moreover, given that the study is based on geolocalized data, some positive corre-
lation depending on distance can arise and the use of spatial models could help to
capture also these aspects.
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1.7 Appendix
The description of the precision code of project-based aid are the following:
1. The coordinates corresponds to an exact location;
2. The coordinates corresponds to a location within 25km or a county;
3. The coordinates corresponds to a district;
4. The coordinates corresponds to a region;
5. The coordinates corresponds to a large feature (such as rivers);
6. The project is national in scope;
7. No location is given or location is unclear;
8. Coordinates correspond to the entire country.
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Chapter 2
Italian Terrorism: Network Analysis
This paper presents the first original micro dataset on Italian terrorists’ socio-economic
characteristics and a first study of political terrorism as a network. The dataset con-
tains 961 individuals and it was created using a wide range of di erent sources and
contains various information, ranging from demographic aspects; to personal back-
ground of the individual as well as information on terrorist activity. We propose a
first application of the data by the use of network analysis and the concept of cen-
trality. The main results highlight the role of women and the trade-o  existing in
connections.
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2.1 Introduction
The phenomena of terrorism is one of the prominent problems that governments have
to face in these last years. This peculiar form of organized crime is not a new form
of attack: despite it was driven mainly by political reasons, it has been very relevant
in the past in countries such as Germany and Italy, in which some national terrorist
groups have been provoking a lot of violence for several years. Several theoretical
and empirical works have tried to explain the socio-economic determinants of this
type of criminal activity, mainly focusing on the macroeconomics determinants (Lai,
2007; Freytag et al., 2011). However, in the literature there are very few empirical
works that study the phenomena from an individual perspective, mainly due to the
absence of micro data and the di culties in collecting them.
This paper aims to fulfill the gap in the literature, by proposing both an original
dataset on the socio-economic characteristics of Italian terrorists, collected by several
di erent sources1, and a preliminary network analysis that explores the phenomena
under a di erent point of view, following the idea that relationships represent an
important key to understanding the specificity of this form of organized crime and,
potentially, the dynamics that encourage individuals to join terrorist groups.
In order to show the potentiality of our dataset, we propose a similar approach in
order to identify if there were some personal characteristics that played a crucial role
in making some individuals to reach a central position within the terrorist group.
The structure of the network is constructed based on some theoretical assumptions,
but the results are in line with what the historical evidences suggest. By using di er-
ent definitions of centrality, our results suggests that despite the number of women
1Namely o cial biographies of former terrorists, victims and relatives of victims; news and
institutional reports, such as newspaper reports; archive material from newspaper and “commissioni
d’inchiesta”; general books on the topic; judicial sources collected by the “Centro di documentazione
Cultura della Legalita` Democratica” in Tuscany and the ”Archivio Dote” filed at the “Istituto Parri”
in Bologna.
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is sensibly lower among the subjects, females tended to be in a more central position
inside the network. Moreover, if a slightly positive correlation is established with
the level of education, the presence of a link between poverty and terrorism inside
the group is not totally ruled out: our results suggest a negative correlation both
with being student or unemployed and with the proxy of the level of income (i.e. the
region of birth). Finally, an interesting result concerns the impact of being formally
recognized as leader inside the group: our analysis suggests that bring in that role
had a negative correlation with being in a central position. Therefore, despite what
general criminal organizations do, Italian terrorist groups tend to organize themselves
in a weakly hierarchical structure. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show two potential di erent
structures, non highly hierarchical and highly hierarchical respectively. In order to
understand the di erence, we take into consideration the simplest definition of cen-
trality, i.e. the most central node is the node that has the highest number of links.
When consider a structure as the one depicted in Figure 2.1, in which the darker
dots represent the formal leaders of the group, the concepts of centrality and being
the leader of the group can coincide. In the example nodes 1 and 2 are both the most
central with 4 links each and the formal bosses of the group. When we consider a
structure of the group as highly hierarchical, like the one presented in figure 2.2, the
two concept are clearly distinct. In the example the most central nodes are node 3
and node 4, while the two formal leaders are represented by node 1 and 2.
Given the topic under analysis, it is important to define what “terrorism” means.
Common definitions of terrorism refer to a succession of violent criminal actions
against state institutions such as governments, politicians, ethnic groups, religious
groups or public figures. Although Italian law does not explicitly defines this form
of subversion, in general we refer to the definition made by the international com-
munity in the League of Nations’ 1937 Convention. Acts of terrorism are defined as
“criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of
terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public”.
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Figure 2.1: Weakly hierarchical network.
Figure 2.2: Highly hierarchical network.
Note: Dark nodes denote agents that are formally recognized as ”leaders” of the group; light nodes
denote the others.
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We focuses on Italy where many radical groups, with di erent political inspira-
tions, have been settled up starting from 1970 and their activities have covered ap-
proximately 20 years, although some attacks (and some arrests from the authorities)
have also occurred in recent years. The country represents a natural environment for
this type of study: according to Della Porta and Rossi, 2.712 events of political vio-
lence linked to terrorism were counted in Italy only between 1969 and 1982 and 324 of
them were directed against people, with 768 injured and 351 killed (Porta and Rossi,
1984). The creation of a completely new dataset lets us, for the first time, to have a
direct measure of aspects that has been discussed in literature. In fact, although the
common-sense suggests that poverty and lack of education are causes of terrorism,
our dataset seems to confirm what several socio-economic studies highlighted in the
recent years. Now a days there is general agreement that terrorist organizations are
composed in large part from people with an higher level of education and more stable
positions with respect to the rest of population (Krueger, 2008; Orsini, 2012).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the literature; Section 2.3
reviews the historical background in which the Italian political terrorism arose, with
a particular focus on the Red Brigades; Section 2.4 presents the dataset, with a focus
on its construction and descriptive statistics; Section 2.5 introduces a first application
by presenting the theoretical construction of the network and a first analysis. The
last section presents the conclusion.
2.2 Literature Review
The study of the dynamics that terrorism has triggered has been the subject of in-
vestigations in various disciplines. In fact, a lot of studies have been performed on
this topic in several areas, such as sociology, psychology and criminology and they
have become more technical and quantitatively oriented. Also economy has been in-
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volved in this kind of research, with several studies concerning the economic impacts
of this illicit behaviour as well as the response of economic policies adopted from the
government with the aim to block the evolution of these groups.
Starting from the 50’s of the last century, both theoretical and empirical works
have been provided in literature concerning di erent aspects of conflicts in general
and organized criminal behaviour in particular, although is only starting from the
80’s that the literature concerning the modelling of conflict as a contest started to
arise, with the works of Hirshleifer (1988) and Grossman (1991). More specifically,
some literature started to focus on organized crime from the 60’s (Sellin, 1963). More
recent literature developed more sophisticated tools that help to predict which illegal
goods will be supplied by such organizations with respect to downstream firms (Dick,
1995), which is the optimal law enforcement (Garoupa, 2000) and to understand how
to allocate punishment e ciently in a general criminal behaviour(Garoupa, 2007).
Although this is not the first paper concerning the individual perspective in crim-
inal organizations, this work represents the first attempt to study the particular
phenomena of terrorism with a micro approach and actual data on terrorists. The
only paper that proposed a study on terrorism under a similar perspective is the
work of Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003) in which the analysis of public opinion polls
conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip “highlights how the support for vio-
lent attacks does not decrease among those with higher education and higher living
standards”. Krueger confirmed this aspect also in a more recent work with Laitin, in
which they provide a study concerning both the country in which an attack occurred
and the country which terrorists belong. They highlight that more a country is rich,
more the probability to su er terrorist attacks is high. Moreover, on the other side,
it seems that there is not a statistically significant predictor of the economic perfor-
mance as determinant of which countries terrorists emerge from (Krueger and Laitin,
2008).
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One application of our dataset is through the use of network analysis technique.
This approach is not new in the literature concerning organized crime given that
starting from the work of Sparrow (1991), the social network approach has been
taken into consideration in this field, but the lack of specific data on the phenomena
did not allow such techniques to be applied. In fact, theoretical approaches that
bring to the identification of the key player inside a group have been proposed by
Ballester et al. (2006); and a first application to organized crime has been provided
by Morselli (2003), who reconstructed the entire network of a single Mafia boss in
New York. Mafia has been also the main organization studied by the empirical liter-
ature, in particular the work of Mastrobuoni and Patacchini (2012) documented the
structure and composition of the geometry of criminal ties between mobsters and
in a more recent work, Mastrobuoni estimated the criminal network e ect on the
economic status of Mafia members (Mastrobuoni, 2015).
2.3 Historical Background
As in many other countries around the world, starting from the 60’s of the last
century several movements formed in Italy in order to combat social and political
prejudices, resulting in the harsh disputes of the two-year period 68-69. However,
unlike in many other nations, in Italy these movements represent the roots for the
formation of political subversive groups that appear in the country for at least the
following 20 years, making Italy an unique example of subversive story at least in the
developed countries in terms of duration, di usion, violence and number of people
involved 2. In fact, the firsts subversive groups represent a reaction to this period
in which labour unions gained a lot of power (especially in political terms), pushing
the extremist groups to a strong isolation in politics. Not by chance the attack that
2See Laqueur (2001).
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historically marks the beginning of the climate of fear is the bomb placed in Milan
at the end of 1969, known as “Strage di Piazza Fontana”, even if some bombs were
placed around the country starting from April of that year3.
It is important to highlight how the country was not able to understand the extent
of the phenomena as well as the roots of this attack. In fact, right after the assault,
the police were convinced that left-wings groups were responsible of the act (in par-
ticular anarchist groups) while in reality was right-wings groups’ responsibility. This
was only the beginning of a long period of threats, attacks and deaths by several
di erent groups. At the end of the 20 years the country registered more than 150
groups linked to Italian terrorism, both from left and right inspiration, even if only
60 of them were actually constituted and operating.
We can divide the history of Italian terrorism in at least three phases: (I) the ori-
gins, between 1969-1972; (II) the period of aggregation, between 1973-1978; (III) the
period of response by institutions, after the killing of On. Moro (1978).
The first phase is characterized by few attacks, even if some of them are the most
bloody of all the period. It is a phase in which the ideals of revolution that will
characterize these associations begin to circulate and several groups start to form,
including the biggest one called ”Brigate Rosse” (Red Brigades).
The second phase represents the real transformation of these groups in actual armed
parties, both from a structural and strategical point of view. It is especially in this
period that di erent groups of the same area start to be more homogeneous and try
to work more together, maintaining anyway di erences among them (often driven by
personal rivalries and strategic di erences). In this phase we have the first merging
between groups: the ”Banda XXII Ottobre” merges with the GAP of Giangiacomo
Feltrinelli in 1972; the two merge with the Brigate Rosse the year after; groups such
as ”Proletari armati in Lotta” and ”Nap” start to work together as well as sev-
3The most important attacks were the bomb placed in Milan’s fair the 25th of April and the
eight bombs placed on di erent trains on the 9th of August.
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eral other groups prepare assaults together. The end of this phase represents the
definitive outbreak of the armed struggle: 1977 represents the year in which a real
escalation of attacks is registered, highlighting the complexity of the phenomena and
imposing an adequate response from the government. It is with the kidnapping of
On. Moro on 16 March 1978 that the State begins a real organized struggle in order
of dismantling the various terrorist groups.
This particular event is the starting point of the third phase. This is a period in
which the institutions recognized the importance of fight terrorism with proper units
and specific programs. A lot of people were arrested between 1978 and 1982 and
after a first moment in which the groups reacted with even more attacks (in 1979
Italy registered 659 di erent attacks), the unity of the groups began to crack helping
authorities in the cells dismantling process. Even if some attacks occurred in more
recent years, historians agree to indicate the end of the climate of fear between 1984
and 1987.
The importance of study the Italian terrorism is linked to the period in which
the phenomena developed: the 70’s. This is a particular period for Italy because
it follows an important structural change occurred in the previous decade, both in
society and economics environment: there was a transformation in the methods of
production and distribution with a weakening of the working class; a development of
international markets at the expense of the national ones; a multicultural integration
occurred; the advanced services became the driving force of the economy. After 25
years of economic growth, a crisis struck a precarious balance of the country, mainly
due to international factors such as the end of the gold exchange standard and the
first oil shock. In this economical context first national terrorists groups born, fur-
ther complicating the socio-economic status of Italy.
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2.3.1 Red Brigades
Among all the groups that characterise this period in Italy, the Red Brigades are
without any doubt the most important group both in terms of number of people
involved, number of attacks and impact on the society. Even if the first ideas and
meetings arose right after the movement of 1968, the o cial year for the beginning of
the Red Brigades is 1970. In fact, in April 1970 for the first time some leaflets signed
as “BR” appear in Milan and few months later, in August, Corrado Simioni, Renato
Curcio, Mara Cagol and Alberto Franceschini formally set up the group. It is only
after one month that the first terrorist attack occurs: on the 17th of September 1970
the garage of a head of the Sit-Siemens, a big company in Milan, is burned. The
group claims responsibility through a statement in which for the first time the logo
of the group is presented: the five-pointed star.
During the first two years the group spread his idea especially in Milan, through
leaflets and brief reports other than some demonstrations like the short kidnapping
of Idalgo Macchiarini on the 3rd of March 1972. This year represents a first turning
point for the Red Brigades: in May for the first time there is an important operation
by the police against the group. The operation turns out to be not successful, with
a lot of persons wanted for arrests that escape. This fact transforms o cially the
group from a semi-clandestine group to an illegal one. At this point the power of
the group substantially increases both in terms of number of components and loca-
tion in which they create bases: on the 18th of April 1974 in Genoa the BR kidnap
Mario Sossi, a court judge. This is the first attack with a national perspective where
instead of focusing on specific neighbourhoods or factories, the group shows general
political aims. The numbers of the organization increase month by month, spreading
their influence in several regions of Italy, including Emilia Romagna, Campania and
Lazio. Another important date for the story of this group is the 4th of June 1975,
when the first kidnap in order to self-financing lead to the killing of Margherita Cagol
during the gunfight. This is the beginning of a change inside the group, resulting
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in a new phase of the red Brigades starting from 1976 where the goal becomes the
attack to the hearth of the State more than small attacks against specific targets.
On the 12th of February 1977 the head of the Ministry of Justice is injured and on
the 18th of April the president of Bar Council of Turin, Fulvio Croce, is killed. As
consequence, the Government establishes high security prisons starting from 1977,
provoking a big response by the group. Several policemen and magistrates are killed
(as for example Riccardo Palma, Lorenzo Cotugno and Rosario Berardi) in the fol-
lowing months, resulting in the kidnapping of the On. Aldo Moro on the 16th of
March 1978. Moro will be held by the group for 55 days, during which the terror-
ists ask for the release of 13 political prisoners and issue releases, as well as Moro’s
letters. The kidnap ends on the 9th of May, when the body of Moro is found in Rome.
The following months are characterised by a strong e ort by the police in order
to dismantle the group and a consequently reaction by the BR. The back-and-forth
between the two parties lasts substantially for two years. The turning point is the
arrests of Patrizio Peci on the 21st of February 1980. For the first time a key repre-
sentative of the group cooperates with the police and several people are arrested in
the following months throughout Italy. This is the beginning of the last phase of BR,
characterized by problems inside the group due mainly to di erent strategic ideas.
In fact, the last attack made as a ”unique group” is the kidnapping of the judge
Giovanni D’Urso from the 12th of December 1980 to the 15th January of 1981, when
he is released. Starting from this date, all the other attacks are claimed by di erent
acronyms, although all traceable to the BR, but the e ort made by the police allows
to destroy the organization piece by piece, bringing to declare the end of the period
of fear between 1984-1987.
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2.4 Data
The complexity and the extension of the phenomena is vast and a complete o cial
database does not exist. For this reason, we had to create a completely new one.
This work is not free of problems: basing on o cial reports, the dimension of the
Italian terrorism starting from the late 1960s is impressive, with more than 1.000
people involved. Most of them have been involved only as militants, without any
substantial part in the most sensational news stories of the time, but a significant
part of them played key roles in violent actions. The phenomena is further compli-
cated by the impressive number of acronyms that appeared in that period, even if
more or less only 60 are the groups that e ectively have been set up and operated,
considering all the political colors. Moreover, for several events there were more
than one judicial trial with di erent people a ected and with controversial outcomes
that bring to confusion. Furthermore, parts of the investigations carried out in this
direction have been marked as confidential.
2.4.1 Sources and Variables
In order to take into consideration all the aspects pointed out in the previous sec-
tions, our approach has been to include in the dataset all the people that have been
involved in at least one trial trying to take track of the largest possible number of
people and to collect the largest number of information.
The database was created using a wide range of di erent sources with the aim
to procure as much information as possible about personal features of the terrorists,
collecting variables related to demographic aspects and personal background as well
as information related to the terrorist activity.
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We started by analysing more than one hundred generic books in order to obtain a
first list of people involved in the phenomena and we expanded the analysis to o cial
biographies both from former terrorists, victims and relatives of victims. Moreover,
given the importance of the topic from a political and institutional point of view, we
analysed the so called “commissioni d’inchiesta parlamentari” (Parliamentary com-
mittees of inquiry). In fact, in order to shed light on all these attacks the Italian
parliament decided to set up several di erent committee of inquiry starting from the
80’s that provided important detailed documents. The work of these panels is still
ongoing in the recent years (the last commission was setted up in 20144), highlighting
the complexity of the problem.
In addition we had access to o cial judicial sources about trials for individuals in-
volved in Italian terrorism. This has been possible thanks to two archives that
collect these sources. The first is the Archivio DOTE, created by Istituto Cattaneo
starting from 1984 and currently preserved by the Istituto Parri in Bologna. The
repository collects interviews to former red and black terrorists (groups of left-wing
political inspiration and of right-wing political inspiration respectively); copies of
flyers through which terrorists claimed the attacks as well as minutes of the inter-
rogations and judgements. The second is the archive created by the “Centro di
documentazione Cultura della Legalita´ Democratica”, a public structure of Tuscany
region which aims to collect, produce and disclose information on organised crime in
general, including terrorism. Finally, by the access to archives of the main Italian
newspaper, we crossed all the data with newspaper reports increasing the informa-
tion collected through o cial channels.
The information that we collected can be divided in 4 big groups.
The first category includes basic information on the demographic characteristics
of the terrorist, namely name; surname; gender; marital status: date of birth; city of
4Law 30 maggio 2014, n. 82.
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birth.
The second group takes track of the information related to the personal back-
ground of the individual. This category includes variable concerning education and
working conditions. In particular, we registered the highest level of qualification
reached by the terrorist (no education, primary education, secondary education,
diploma, university degree) and, if she has a diploma or a university degree, the
type of school (or university) attended. Similarly we provide a variable that register
the employment conditions (student, worker, student-worker, unemployed, retired)
and a second variable registering the specific type of school attended or the specific
type of work. Moreover, for some of the individuals, our dataset includes the same
information concerning her parents.
It is important to highlight that all the information are registered at the moment
in which the individual decides to join the group; this means that if one individual
decides to enter in the group while she is an university student, in the dataset she is
recorded as ”university student” in the variable ”type of work” and as ”diploma” in
”level of education”.
The third category includes information more related to the terrorist activity.
Next to variables that register the group to which they belong and the consequent
political color (right or left); we collect information on the battle name assumed
by the individual; the city of militancy (that by definition coincide with the city of
residence); the role that the individual played (militant or boss, which is the formal
leader recognised by the group); the year of entering (and eventually either the year
of exit or the year of change of the group) and all the information related to the
judgement procedure (year of arrest, starting year of the trial, year of the end of
the trial, type of sentences and year of sentences). Moreover, our dataset includes
information about the technical role played inside the terrorist body (organisational
role, executive role, logistic role) and whether the individual has been hurt or died
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during an operation and the relative year of death.
Finally, the last category includes additional information such as the specific
address of residence; information about hiding and eventually information about re-
lationships with other terrorists.
Our dataset includes 961 individuals linked to terrorist groups operating in Italy
since 1969. Unfortunately, the di culties highlighted in the introductory part of
this section did not allow to obtain all the information for each of the individu-
als. However, the richness of the dataset allows to define di erent samples based on
the selection of specific variables. In the following subsection we present statistical
evidences from the dataset.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 reports the percentages for each category of the most important variables
in the dataset.
Literature on crime, and more specifically on organized crime, highlights how
men are more inclined to take part to criminal activities than women. This idea
seems to be respected also concerning terrorism: our dataset highlighted how on 961
terrorists for which we registered the information about gender, 80.85% are males.
Considering the role that each individual plays inside the group, and focusing only
on the individuals that are registered as boss in the dataset, this percentage even
decreases. In fact, considering 100 the total number of bosses in the database, only
15,67% are women. These results seem to be in line with what the literature shows.
Some interesting considerations arise from the analysis of the date of birth of the
individuals5. We range from 1903 to 1976, where the mean is represented by 1951.
5We are able to reconstruct this information for 861 individuals.
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Not surprising, most of the individuals were born in the late 1940s and 1950s: the
percentage strongly increases during the 1950s, than decelerate again considering the
beginning of 1960s. This aspect is confirmed also by the cumulative data: percentage
moves from the 17.65% in 1945 to the 94.31% in 1960. Moreover, if we compute the
average age when the person is arrested (or eventually died) we obtain a value which
ranges from 16 to 79 years old, with an average age of 28,8 which is coherent with
the previous values.
Our dataset includes also information about the place in which the individual is
born. In order to make this information comparable across individuals, we com-
puted the region and we aggregate according to the level of income following the
work of Malanima and Daniele (2011). We divided the regions in three groups: high
income level, that substantially correspond to the northern regions, middle income
level, that are the regions of the centre of Italy and low income level, that correspond
to the southern regions of the country. Despite in literature one of the motivations
that are given in order to explain criminal behaviour is the presence of poverty as
one of the main factors that pushes individuals to enter in organized groups, the evi-
dences coming from this classification seems to suggest an absence of a clear pattern
of poverty in this specific type of organized crime. In fact, only 22% of our sample
come from regions historically pointed out as ”poor regions”; while the largest num-
ber of individuals come from rich regions.
In order to have a first idea about the possibility of a migration pattern behind this
phenomena we computed the same type of aggregation also for the region of mili-
tancy, that is the region in which the individual reside and consequently the region in
which the individual mainly works to prepare the demonstrations and attacks. Look-
ing at this variable the di erences between the rich regions and the poor regions is
increased: terrorists in poor regions pass from 22% to 11.43% while the other two
categories increase their percentage.
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The database also allows us to make some statistical inferences on the background
of terrorists. In fact, even if the dataset contains this information only for 642 in-
dividuals, some pattern can be highlighted. Only 3.27% of terrorists has the lowest
educational studies level, which is primary school or less; 28.04% has the secondary
school; 56.23% the diploma and the 12.46% have the highest level of education which
corresponds to the university degree. These number suggests that, on average, Italian
terrorists are well educated with respect to the rest of the population (the compul-
sory schooling was up to the secondary school), highlighting the peculiarity of this
type of organised crime.
Table 2.2 shows the type of high school attended by the individuals that reached that
level of education and it is compared with the Italian census of 1981. The largest
part of individuals attended either a technical institute or an high school, confirming
the absence of a pattern of ”low education” as one of the motivation behind the
phenomena. Moreover, this concentration in some specific type of schools can reflect
the idea that a large part of recruitment by terrorists groups takes place in the school
environment.
The specificity of the type of school disappears when we focus on the type of faculty
chosen at the university: Table 2.3 shows the comparison between the dataset and
the information included in the Italian census of 1981. Table 2.4 reports the details
of the dataset. It shows that in this case the level of attendance is substantially
equally spread through all the faculties6.
A similar analysis can be made by focusing on variables concerning the work-
ing experience. At the moment of adhesion to a terrorist group, the 26.82% of
individuals were students, percentage that rises to 30.59% if we consider also the
“students-workers”; 65.64% of individuals was working when they decided to join
the group while 3,77% were either unemployed or retired. As before, these numbers
6These data refers to 68 individuals that are the ones for which the dataset contains the specific
type of faculty attended.
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Dataset Census 1981
Scientific high school 25.12% 16.00%
Classic high school 16.26% 8.40%
Other high school 3.93% 12.30%
Technical institute 33.01% 44.40%
Specialisation in surveying 7.39% Not available
Other Institutes 14.29% 18,90%
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of high school attendance
Notes: Data of census is from ISTAT, we decided to use the census 1981 because it is the one in
the middle of the period under analysis. In census 1981 specialisation in surveying is included in
other institutes.
Dataset Census 1981
Literature Area 27.94% 22.20%
Law Area 14.71% 14.10%
Economic Area 16.18% 16.20%
Other 41.17% 47.50%
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of university attendance
Notes: Data of census is from ISTAT.
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Dataset
Faculty of Literature 16.18%
Faculty of Medicine 14.71%
Faculty of Law 16.18%
Faculty of Philosophy 11.76%
Faculty of Architecture 10.29%
Faculty of Sociology 8.82%
Other Faculties 22.06%
Table 2.4: Detailed statistics of university attendance
seem to rule out poverty as one of the reasons for joining a terrorist group. In fact,
if we assume that unemployment can be a signal of poverty, the largest amount of
individuals in the dataset were working when they decided to enter in the terrorist
activity, knowing that they were risking to lose their job.
In the dataset there are information also on the type of job that individuals were
doing. According to the data of the Italian census of 1981, 12.7% of the workers
worked in the primary sector; 35.7% in the secondary sector while 51.6% worked in
the third sector. By focusing on the dataset that we are analyzing only 0.6% of the
sample worked in the primary sector, while 46.93% of the individuals worked in the
secondary sector and the rest in the third sector.
Table 2.5 shows a more detailed classification of the type of work according to
the sector to which they belong.
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Dataset
Work industry 32.67%
Logistic industry 13.67%
Education industry 8.92%
Health industry 6.34%
Trade industry 4.95%
Technicians 4.76%
Publishing industry 1.99%
Professionals
self-employed
4.36%
Security industry 2.78%
Journalistic industry 1.19%
Public o cials 2.37%
Self-employed 2.77%
Agriculture industry 0.6%
Accountant industry 0.99%
Other industries 11.64%
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics of type of work per sector
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According to the data, the location in which the terrorists’ ideology was more devel-
oped was the working class, that corresponds to the 32.67% of our sample. Important
percentages are also the ones registered by the logistic industry (13.67%),which in-
cludes employers and clerks; the education industry (8.92%) which includes teachers,
professors and researchers and the health sector (6.34%) which includes nurses and
doctors. This results highlight two di erent aspects: on one hand the large number
of workers may be due to the ease of transmission among people less qualified; on
the other hand, the presence of more skilled jobs (such as nurses) highlight the need
of these particular jobs in such peculiar organizations. In fact, given the actions that
these type of groups perform, the presence of high qualified people is necessary. For
example, in order to construct a bomb to place in a square, a strong knowledge of
chemistry is needed; the ability to take care of wounded members is a specific task
that in direct actions can be fundamental.
Finally, the dataset includes variables on aspects more closely linked to the ter-
rorist activity. In particular, given that the database was constructed independently
from the political color of the individuals, it is interesting to study the number of
people involved in left-wings groups and in right-wings groups. Despite this, the
statistics show that the 80.79% of records are related to subversive groups of left-
wing while only the 19.21% are related to right-wing groups. The results are in line
with the historical facts reported both by general books and by judicial reconstruc-
tions. In fact, the chronicles starting from the late 60’s report a larger number of
terrorist actions committed by left-wing groups with respect to the ones commit-
ted by right-wing associations. Moreover, the largest actions assigned to right-wing
groups, such as the “strage di Bologna” or “strage di Piazza Fontana”, had more
than one trials with no clear ending and some of these actions are still unpunished.
Table 2.6 shows the detail for the main acronyms that appeared during the period un-
der analysis. Coherently with the historical facts, the group that is most represented
are the Red Brigades, with 48,81% of the individuals recorded. Other important
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left-wing organizations are Prima Linea (11,29%) and NAP (3.45%). Focusing on
the right-wing groups, the most numerous group are the NAR and Terza Posizione
(respectively 4,70% and 4,39% of the total). These results are coherent with the o -
cial data given by the Italian government: the most planned subversive organization
was the Red Brigades which, in spite of several internal problems that have also led
to several splits in time, have shown to be present in the Italian territory also in
recent years.
Political Area Dataset
Prima Linea Left 11.29%
Brigate Rosse Left 46.81%
Partito Comunista
Combattente
Left 1.88%
Ordine Nero Right 4.81%
Terza Posizione Right 4.39%
NAR Right 4.70%
NAP Left 3.45%
Collettivi Politici
Veneti
Left 1.46%
Rosa dei Venti Right 2.61%
Others Both 16,6%
Table 2.6: Shares of terrorist groups in dataset
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Boss Militants
Elementary school 5.06% 2.42%
Secondary school 25.32% 28.23%
Diploma 53.80% 56.45%
BUniversity degree 15.83% 12.90%
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics of leaders and militants according to their level of
education
Finally it is important to highlight the results registered about the variable con-
cerning the role of the terrorists within the groups: one-fifth of the dataset includes
people that has been recognised as boss inside a group. Even if this number seems
really high it is coherent with the phenomena. In fact, it is shown by historical facts
that once one of the leader has been caught by the police the group was really fast
in organising and in eliciting a new formal boss.
An interesting point to verify is whether the key roles of the organization are
covered by the most educated people. By considering as 100 the total number of
managers that are recorded, it is possible to cross the data with the information
concerning the educational qualification. Table 2.7 shows these results. By compar-
ing it with the education in table 1 it is clear that the percentages are not strongly
di erent, suggesting that education does not seem to play a role in the election of a
boss inside a terrorist group.
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2.5 Application
In this section we present a first application of the dataset by the use of network
analysis.
2.5.1 Network Identification
In order to apply the methods of network analysis it is necessary to identify variables
that can help to infer connections between the individuals in the dataset. Unfortu-
nately, despite the large amount of sources used in order to create the database, none
of the variables included gives a clear and direct indication concerning the connec-
tions that exist between terrorists. For this reason we have to find an indirect way
for this definition.
By reading books on the topic, it seems reasonable an artificial construction of the
connections based on three variables in the database: the terrorist group, the region
of militancy and the period between the date of entry in the group and the date
of arrest. Unfortunately we don’t have these information for all the individuals in
the dataset (especially the information concerning the precise year of entry in the
group), therefore we were forced to reduce the sample only to people with the fields
complete, obtaining a new database of 399 people (346 of which belong to left-wing
groups). In order to rule out big di erences in the two samples on the main vari-
ables, we performed a t-test in order to check the absence of di erences in mean.
The results are presented in the appendix.
The connection between two individuals exists if:
(Ii,j)©max[(1i,g,t ú1j,g,t); (1i,a,r,t ú1j,a,r,t)] = 1
Where i and j represent the individuals; g is the group to which each individual
belongs; t is the year in which the individual is inside the group; a represents the
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political color of the group and r is the region of militancy.
Therefore two individuals are linked if (i) they operate in the same group during
the same period or (ii) they belong to di erent groups of the same area but they
operate in the same region of militancy in the same period.
The correctness of the artificial network is confirmed by historical evidences: this
insight is due to the numerous depositions given by terrorists after their arrests in
which they highlighted the importance of coordination at national level, that implies
that individuals belonging to the same group probably know each others indepen-
dently from the region in which they live, and the continuous flows of individuals
between di erent groups. A clear example of this last point is given by Figure 2.3. It
is a map that shows the main left-wing organizations and highlight the connections
between groups.
Following this type of definition we obtain two di erent network based on the polit-
ical color of the groups: one for the left-wing terrorists, another one for right-wing
terrorists. Given a greater number of individuals in the first group, the following
analysis is performed only on the left-wing network.
It is important to underline a particular feature of this specific network. In
this context, connections can potentially have a double impact: they turn out to be
positive, because the more connection one person has the easier is to hide, to prepare
attacks, etcetera, until one of the two nodes is captured by the police; at this point
this connection became negative, because the possibility that the captured terrorist
confess increases the danger for the other individual (Baccara and Bar-Isaac, 2008).
Following this logic it is plausible that an high-ranked terrorist tends to be more
protected within its own group compared to persons holding non-managerial roles.
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Figure 2.3: Map of main left-wing organizations. Source: Prette (2006)
2.5.2 Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
The goal of this analysis it to understand if there were factors that helped an in-
dividual to reach a central position within a terrorist group. This let us have a
picture of what happened inside the network during the 20 years of the ”period of
fear”, and identify some structural characteristics that were underestimated by the
government. In fact, the government faced the phenomena of terrorism with the
same tools that they used for facing the Mafia phenomena but the two follows two
completely di erent patterns both in the structure and in the actions. One of the
problem of the Italian police has been to not be able to identify specific peculiarity of
the phenomena: if we are able to identify some characteristics that help one person
to reach the central position, it is possible to specifically target them and accelerate
the disruption of the entire network.
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Average Degree 96.595
Density 0.280
Components 3
Component Ratio 0.006
Fragmentation 0.034
Average Distance 1.928
Breadth 0.410
Table 2.8: Network cohesion measures
Some preliminary analysis can be done on the structure of the network. Table
2.8 reports the main network measures (all the measures are formally defined in the
appendix).
One of the most important concepts in this type of literature is the concept of
density. This measure studies the degree of cohesion of the network, by taking into
consideration both the potential connections and the actual ones. It is define as the
ratio between the maximum number of connections over the total number of actual
links. In this network the value is equal to 0.280, which means that 28% of all pos-
sible linkages is present. Even if this number is not really high in absolute terms,
considering the specificity of the topic, it suggests a greater presence of links with
respect to other standard criminal groups.
A second important index that describes the network is the average geodesic dis-
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tance among reachable pairs. This index indicate the average number of steps that
are needed in order to reach all network participants: the lower is this number, the
easier is to reach all the other nodes. In this case the value is 1.928, indicating that
on average it is necessary to pass through only 2 other nodes in order to reach all
the other individuals. These aspects can explain why, once one of the formal bosses
is captured by the police, she is easily replaced by someone else: the nodes where
strongly linked one to another and even one of the o cial leaders was caught and
ruled out from the network, the other nodes had all the necessary information to
easily find someone else to put formally at the top.
Finally the fragmentation index signals the presence of isolated nodes. In fact it
represents the proportion of pairs of nodes that are unreachable from each other by
any path. In this network the index is really close to 0 (0.034) indicating substan-
tially an absence of isolated nodes.
In order to reach the goal of the work we use di erent definition of centrality and
we develop a simple linear relationship between these indexes of centrality and the
observable characteristics of each single terrorist. The general model is:
Ck(i, ) = –+ —Xi+ “Zi+ ‘i
Where Xi is a vector of personal characteristics, which includes sex, civil status,
region of birth; education and occupational conditions; while Zi represent character-
istics linked to terrorist activity such as age at the moment of entrance in the group
and the o cial role inside the organization; ‘i denotes the random error term.
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2.5.3 Results
In order to define the dependent variable we used di erent definition of centrality.
The first one is the simplest among the di erent definitions: it captures the promi-
nence of a node taking in consideration its degree, meaning the number of direct links
stemming from each node in the network. Formally, the degree centrality of a node i
in the network   is the number of connections of the node divided by the maximum
possible number of connections. The higher is the number of connections, the higher
is the centrality of the node i.
A more sophisticated concept is the one represented by the second definition that
we used, i.e. the Bonachich power centrality. Substantially it represents a weighted
degree centrality: the level of centrality of individual is not determined only by the
number of connections that it has, but also by the type of node to which the indi-
vidual is connected, i.e. how many connections the actors in the neighbourhood have.
Once the centrality indexes are computed, it is possible to do a second check
of the correctness of the artificial network. In fact, given that we are referring to a
period that is historically ended, once the indexes are computed it is possible to have
an ex-post check by ranking all the individuals according to their level of centrality
and compare these names with the ones that historically have been recognised as the
real leaders of the phenomena. Table 2.9 shows the list of the 5 members with the
higher indexes for both the definitions and the 5 members with the lowest scores.
In general, the names that are highlighted by these analysis correspond to the ones
indicated as the key players by historians.
Table 2.10 presents the results of the OLS regression: the first two columns use
Degree centrality as dependent variable while the last two use Bonachich centrality.
74
Chapter 2. Italian Terrorism: Network Analysis
Degree Centrality Bonachich Centrality
(TOP 5) (LAST 5) (TOP 5) (LAST 5)
Mario Moretti Paolo Dorigo Mario Moretti Mario Rossi
Pasqua Aurora
Betti
Daniele Bencini Pasqua Aurora
Betti
Paola Besuschio
Maria Carla
Brioschi
Ovidio
Bompressi
Remo Pancelli Paolo Dorigo
Luca Mario
Efisto Nicolotti
Giuliano Pinori Barbara
Balzerani
Renato Rinaldi
Rocco Micaletto Luigi Fuccini Giovanna
Lombardi
Silvio Gibelli
Table 2.9: List of top 5 and last 5 individuals according to their centrality values
The first interesting result of this work is linked to the role of women. As high-
lighted in the previous sections, literature on criminal activities claims that inside
criminal groups there is a sexual racism, which implies that males have more power
with respect to women. While this situation is confirmed by looking at the de-
scriptive statistics, in which women represent less then 20% of the total number of
subjects, it does not seem confirmed once we enter inside the group. In fact the result
of the regression suggests that females tend to play a more crucial role in the dy-
namics of the group, resulting in a more central position inside the network. In fact
the coe cient of the dummy variable female (which takes vale 1 if the individual’s
gender is feminine and 0 otherwise) is positive and strongly significant in both the
specifications even if in the second definition the magnitude is smaller. This result
suggests an important di erent pattern with respect to the other types of organized
crime that could be studied in further works.
According to our results education does not seems to be an important element
for determine the centrality index: none of the education variables taken into consid-
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Degree Centrality Bonachich Centrality
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Female 0.0696***
(0.023)
0.0646***
(0.023)
0.0189***
(0.006)
0.0175***
(0.006)
Born in rich regions -0.0388
(0.024)
-0.0629**
(0.026)
-0.0147**
(0.006)
-0.0168**
(0.007)
Born in mid regions 0.0902***
(0.026)
0.0650**
(0.032)
0.0258***
(0.006)
0.0138*
(0.008)
Secondary school 0.0876*
(0.052)
0.0771
(0.052)
0.0195
(0.013)
0.0162
(0.013)
Diploma 0.0613
(0.052)
0.0574
(0.052)
0.0132
(0.013)
0.0103
(0.013)
University degree 0.1240**
(0.056)
0.1146**
(0.056)
0.0281**
(0.014)
0.0229*
(0.014)
Unemployed -0.0953*
(0.057)
-0.0961*
(0.057)
0.0230
(0.014)
0.0257
(0.014)
Student 0.0638***
(0.023)
-0.0554**
(0.023)
-0.0149***
(0.006)
-0.0133**
(0.006)
Student-Worker 0.0647
(0.051)
0.0574
(0.051)
0.0163
(0.012)
0.0141
(0.012)
Boss -0.0475**
(0.021)
-0.0151**
(0.005)
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes
Terrorist activity controls no yes no yes
Constant 0.1964***
(0.052)
0.1363*
(0.070)
0.0405***
(0.013)
0.0302*
(0.017)
Observations 346 346 346 346
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.26
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01
Table 2.10: OLS regression with Degree Centrality and Bonachich Centrality
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eration are significant with the exception of the highest level of education. In fact,
an individual that has a university degree have more probability of being central
with respect to an individual with the lowest level of education. This is particularly
true if we accept as definition of centrality the degree centrality index (in both the
version of the regression the coe cient is strongly significant and positive) while it
is less strong if we focus on the second one (in the last column it is significant only
at a 10% level).
If we accept the region of birth as a proxy of the income of the individual, the
negative coe cient of the dummy variable representing the rich regions suggest a
negative relationship between income and centrality in the group.
Also the employment conditions does not seems to play a crucial role. In fact,
the only characteristic that plays a role in this setting is being a student: if the in-
dividual decide to enter in the terrorist group while he was still attending the school
she has less probability of becoming central inside the network.
Finally, an interesting result concerns the impact of being formally recognized as
leader inside the group: our analysis suggests that filling that role has a negative
correlation with being in a central position. This result is in line with the theoret-
ical trade-o  highlighted by Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008). Indeed, in such type of
organizations connections play a double role: on one hand, the larger the number of
connections the easier the movement inside the organization both in logistic and op-
erative terms; on the other hand having a lot of connections makes the subject more
vulnerable, especially once one of the link is caught by the authorities. Following
this line of reasoning, it is not surprising that formal boss are not necessary the real
central player of the network.
In order to exclude the possibility that these results are driven by the fact that
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women tends to stay in the network for a longer period or that there is a greater
probability that women enters only in the biggest groups, we run other two spec-
ifications. In fact, given that one of the variable on which the network structure
is created is based on the temporary element, if women on average are present for
a larger number of year in the network then their centrality is structurally higher
with respect to men. A similar line of reasoning can be made for the dimension of
the group: if women enters only in the largest groups, their centrality is higher by
definition.
Table 2.11 shows a standard OLS regression taking as dependent variable the
number of years of presence in the network, which is the di erence between the year
of arrest (or death) and the year of entering in the group.
Table 2.12 instead presents the results of a linear probability model in which the
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual belongs to the Red Brigades, which
is the biggest group in the dataset, and 0 otherwise.
Following the results, if it is not possible to rule out that the positive coe cient
found for the variable university degree is driven by the highest probability of being
caught in a longer amount of time; this is not true for the other variables.
In detail, the coe cient of the variable capturing the gender of the individual is not
significant in any specifications, with the exception of the first column in Table 2.11
where it slightly positive and slightly significant. However, once we control for vari-
ables more related to the terrorist activity, this significance disappear. This suggests
that the positive coe cient associated to female in the centrality regression is not a
result of the theoretical structure of the network but it underlines di erent motiva-
tions.
Moreover, the negative and significant coe cient associated to the variable ”stu-
dent” in Table 2.12 can give some explanation of the negative coe cient found in
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(1) (2)
Female 0.2496
(0.3813)
0.2861
(0.3763)
Born in rich regions -0.1463
(0.4047)
-0.6319
(0.4402)
Born in mid regions 0.6228
(0.4242)
0.5830
(0.5311)
Secondary school 0.2143
(0.8503)
0.3538
(0.8513)
Diploma 0.2317
(0.8507)
0.4595
(0.8519)
University degree 1.3881
(0.9199)
1.7949**
(0.9094)
Unemployed 0.1836
(0.9417)
0.4558
(0.9280)
Student -0.3226
(0.3790)
-0.2371
(0.3764)
Student-Worker 0.1557
(0.8350)
0.1976
(0.8219)
Boss 1.0408***
(0.3390)
Demographic controls yes yes
Terrorist activity controls no yes
Constant 3.7714***
(0.8532)
2.8816**
(1.1518)
Observations 346 346
R-squared 0.04 0.09
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01
Table 2.11: OLS regression with year of presence in the network
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(1) (2)
Female 0.1169*
(0.0609)
0.0972
(0.605)
Born in rich regions -0.1195*
(0.0675)
-0.1705**
(0.0733)
Born in mid regions 0.0867
(0.0688)
0.0135
(0.0911)
Secondary school 0.2783*
(0.1427)
0.2193
(0.1401)
Diploma 0.1489
(0.1442)
0.1055
(0.1414)
University degree 0.2239
(0.1564)
0.1869
(0.1521)
Unemployed -0.2309
(0.1756)
-0.2463
(0.1690)
Student -0.1681**
(0.0665)
-0.1550**
(0.0679)
Student-Worker 0.1678*
(0.0953)
0.1349
(0.0935)
Boss -0.1658***
(0.0593)
Demographic controls yes yes
Terrorist activity controls no yes
Constant 0.4509***
(0.1448)
0.4369**
(0.1978)
Observations 346 346
R-squared 0.11 0.14
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01
Table 2.12: Linear probability model with Red Brigades as dependent variables and
robust S.E.
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Table 2.10.
Finally, the negative coe cient associated to the variable capturing the role of the
individual inside the group in Table 2.12, which means that if an individual enters
in the biggest group her probability of becoming a leader is lower with respect to
be a simple militant, is counterbalanced by the positive coe cient reported in Table
2.10, suggesting that bosses have an higher probability of staying for a longer time
inside the network. These results are in line with the prediction that bosses tend to
be more protected by the group and it reinforces the results highlighted in Table 2.10.
Alternative applications can be provided using as dependent variable two di er-
ent definitions of centrality: Closeness centrality and Betweenness centrality.
Table 2.13 shows the results for these two definitions.
The Closeness centrality is a measure based on proximity: it is necessary to define
formally the total distance from a node i to all other nodes in a network   which is
the sum of the number of links in the shortest path between i and j.
Analysing the first two columns the results are in line to what showed in the previous
points: females tend to have a more central position inside the group as well as being
born in a rich region seems to be detrimental.
The main di erence is represented by the education variables: in this case both
secondary school and university degree are positive and significant at a 5% level.
However, given the results highlighted by Tables 2.11 and 2.12 these two coe cient
seems to be driven by the structure of the network itself.
Finally, also in this specification the variable indicating the leaders inside the group
has a negative sign, confirming have been found in Table 2.10.
81
Chapter 2. Italian Terrorism: Network Analysis
Closeness Centrality Betweenness Centrality
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Female 0.0341***
(0.013)
0.0297**
(0.013)
0.0001
(0.001)
0.0002
(0.001)
Born in rich regions -0.0163
(0.014)
-0.03638**
(0.015)
-0.0159*
(0.001)
-0.0329***
(0.001)
Born in mid regions 0.02565*
(0.014)
0.0177
(0.018)
-0.0013
(0.001)
-0.0001
(0.001)
Secondary school 0.0748***
(0.029)
0.0639**
(0.028)
-0.0046**
(0.002)
-0.0046**
(0.002)
Diploma 0.0507*
(0.029)
0.0463
(0.028)
-0.0041 **
(0.002)
-0.0035*
(0.002)
University degree 0.0836***
(0.031)
0.0775**
(0.030)
-0.0033*
(0.002)
-0.0023
(0.002)
Unemployed -0.0470
(0.032)
-0.0460
(0.031)
0.0045**
(0.002)
0.0053***
(0.002)
Student -0.0168
(0.013)
-0.01142*
(0.013)
-0.0015*
(0.001)
-0.0013
(0.001)
Student-Worker 0.0454
(0.028)
0.0394
(0.027)
-0.0011
(0.002)
-0.0011
(0.002)
Boss -0.0396***
(0.011)
0.001**
(0.001)
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes
Terrorist activity controls no yes no yes
Constant 0.4453***
(0.029)
0.4146***
(0.038)
0.0081***
(0.002)
0.0063**
(0.002)
Observations 346 346 346 346
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.13
*p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01
Table 2.13: OLS regression with Closeness Centrality and Betweenness Central-
ity
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On the contrary, columns 3 and 4 present substantial di erences with respect to
what highlighted in the previous points.
In fact the betweenness centrality is a measure linked to the position of a node
in all the paths of the network. It is necessary to compute the number of geodesics
distances between a node k and another node j where i lies on. In other words, it
indicate how important the node i is in terms of connecting nodes k and j. The
closest is the index to 1, the most important is i for the connection between the
other two nodes.
This is not a surprising result given that this particular definition of centrality
capture an aspect completely di erent with respect to the previous ones and it is the
most sensible to the structure of the network. Moreover, the magnitude of the coe -
cients suggests that if we believe that this is the best definition of centrality for this
type of setting, further information are needed in order to make some useful analysis.
2.6 Conclusion
Given the total absence of micro data on individuals belonging to terrorists group,
this paper presented the first original micro dataset on Italian terrorists’ socio-
economic characteristics and proposed a first application based on the use of network
analysis, following the idea that relationships represent an important key to under-
stand the phenomenon and potentially the dynamics that encourage individuals to
join terrorist groups. The paper focuses on Italy where many radical groups, with
di erent political inspirations, have been settled up starting from 1969 and their
activities have covered approximately 20 years.
The dataset was created in order to obtain information about terrorists’ personal
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features at the moment they decided to join the group, by using a wide range of
di erent sources: (i) O cial biographies of former terrorists, victims and victims’
relatives; (ii) News and institutional reports, such as newspaper reports, archive ma-
terial from newspaper and “commissioni d’inchiesta” (inquiry board); (iii) General
books on the topic; (iv) Judicial sources. We created a list of 961 terrorists linked
to terrorist groups even if not for all of them all the variables have been reconstructed.
For this reason, in order to perform the analysis, we reduced the sample only to
subject whose fields were nearly completed, obtaining a new database of 399 people
(346 of which belong to left-wing groups). We reconstruct the network and calculated
the centralities of each individual, according to 4 di erent definitions: Degree cen-
trality; Bonacich’s centrality; Closeness centrality and Betweenness centrality. The
correctness of the artificial network is confirmed both by historical evidence and by
ex-post evaluations. Therefore, we provided an analysis considering the four di erent
indexes of centrality and the observable characteristics of each terrorist.
The main results highlight the role of women and the trade-o  of connections. Firstly,
di erently from the general result suggested by organized crime literature, women
were found to be in a more central position in the network as compared to men.
Secondly, being formally recognized as a leader inside the group has a negative cor-
relation with having a central position. Indeed, in such type of organizations connec-
tions play a double role. On one hand, they increase operational e ciency; on the
other hand, they make the subject more vulnerable once one of the links is captured
by the authorities. Thus, it is not surprising that formally recognised bosses are not
necessary the most central players of the network.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 T-test in mean
2.7.2 Network Cohesion Measures
Let N = |V | be the number of nodes, and L= |E| be the number of edges:
• Average Degree: Average number of link per person
qN
i=1deg(i)
N
= 2L
N
• Density: Degree of cohesion of the network
L
nú(n≠1)
2
= ActualConnections
PotentialConnections
• Components: Number of disconnected parts, i.e. there is no path that can get
you from a node in one component to a node in another component.
• Component Ratio: Number of component divided by number of nodes
Components
N
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Variable
Category
G
lobal
D
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educed
D
ataset
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ean
<
0
Pr(T
<
t)
m
ean
,0
Pr(|T|>
|t|)
m
ean
>
0
Pr(T
>
t)
G
EN
D
ER
M
ales
Fem
ales
80,85%
19,15%
79,55%
20,55%
0.132
0.2641
0.8680
CIV
IL
STATU
S
Unm
arried
D
ivorced
M
arried
84,60%
13,53%
1,87%
79,95%
18,25%
2,00%
0.6092
0.7815
0.3908
ZO
N
E
O
F
BIRTH
Rich
regions
M
id
regions
Poorregions
45,00%
33,10%
22,00%
40,06%
36,84%
22,56%
0.001
0.001
0.9999
ED
U
CATIO
N
Elem
entary
Secondary
High
school
University
3,27%
28,04%
56,23%
12,46%
3,51%
27,07%
56,64%
12,78%
0.3758
0.7516
0.6242
EM
PLOY
M
.
Student
W
orker
Stud.-W
ork.
O
ther
26,82
65,64
3,77%
3,77%
32,33
61,40
3,51%
2,76%
0.999
0.0003
0.0001
ZO
N
E
O
F
M
ILI-
TA
N
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Rich
regions
M
id
regions
Poorregions
53,39%
35,18%
11,43%
53,63%
39,85%
6,79%
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0.4317
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m
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Chapter 3
Homophily in Terrorist Networks
This work aims to study the evolution through time of a terrorist network and to un-
derstand the whether the recruitment policy follows a strategic path or it is random,
focusing on the concept of ”homophily”. Since the mid of the last century literature
has provided evidence of strong presence of homophily in social interaction under sev-
eral di erent dimensions: age, gender, ethnicity, educational level and occupational
conditions. Thanks to the new dataset presented in the previous chapter and the
reconstruction of the network dimension of the phenomena, it is possible to analyse
the evolution of the terrorist network using the concept of temporal social network.
The main results indicate a change in the homophily structure through time, and
this change goes in the opposite direction with respect to the standard literature. In
fact, the analysis highlights a strong presence of heterophily in several dimensions
while literature on social networks reports a standard presence of homophily. This
suggests that the recruitment policy by terrorist groups does not follow the usual path,
indicating a strong strategic pattern.
87
Chapter 3. Homophily in Terrorist Networks
3.1 Introduction
Homophily is one of the most important concepts in network analysis. The main
goal of this specific tool is to answer a simple question: ”Are people more prone to
connect with other people similar to themselves?”. In general terms, it is shown that
this simple concept has a lot of di erent implications under several points of view,
some of which are really important in economic contexts. Indeed, it is shown that
presence of homophily in a group improve coordination as well as tolerance and co-
operation. Moreover, it helps to access information and to form opinions and social
norms.
Some of these concepts can be fundamental in a terrorist group: coordination and
cooperation are between the most important features that need to be achieved in
order to organise and to implement attacks, even the smallest ones. As a matter of
fact, having a clear plan that all the people involved in the operation need to know
and to accept is necessary, especially given the high risk of these type of activities.
Moreover, having easy access to the largest amount of information can be the crucial
point for the preservation of the group and to avoid that some of the participants
are captured by the police.
Nevertheless, applying a strategic choice in the recruitment of new militants can
be fundamental for the survival of the group. In fact, selecting appropriate mil-
itants with specific characteristics and creating relationships with people that are
totally di erent from the one already in the network, can help the group to hide
inside society and to make the investigation for the police more di cult. For this
reason a strategic pattern can be highlighted by the presence of heterophily in the
network: acting in the opposite way from what one could expect as regards com-
mon group dynamics implies a precise recruitment policy which aims to make more
di cult for the police to easily detect connections once one of the terrorists is caught.
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This research provides an empirical investigation into the evolution of a political
terrorist network over time, under the hypothesis that the enrolment of new militants
follows a strategic path and is not merely linked to people’s political ideology.
This hypothesis is motivated by the observation of the Italian phenomena: as
pointed out in the previous chapters of this work, Italy underwent a period of in-
tense terrorist attacks based on political ideology with daily assaults through all
over the country. Although a major deployment of forces, this phenomenon lasted
for about 20 years reflecting a huge di culty of the authorities in facing this type
of organizations, which had the ability of continuously reorganizing themselves and
evolve.
As previously presented, Italy represents a natural environment for this type of
studies, mainly for three reasons:
• Presence of a large amount of radical groups of di erent political inspirations;
• Daily-based episodes of political violence linked to these groups, with several
attacks against civilians;
• Thanks to the e ort presented in the previous chapters of the thesis, it is
possible to have a specific micro dataset that can be exploited in order to
examine the dynamics of the terrorist groups.
Having clear the motivations behind this work, the objective is to understand if
there is some evidence in favour of the idea that recruitment policy made by terrorist
groups is not random but it follows a strategic path. In order to explore the evolution
of the characteristics of the people involved in the network, we used the dataset con-
structed and presented in the previous chapter of this thesis. We used the concept
of Temporal Social Network and we studied the homophily of the network at regular
intervals, in order to have a clear evolution of the group. Given the specificity of
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this type of analysis, we overcame the problem of absence of independence between
observations by applying the Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure.
Moreover, in order to have a comprehensive view of the phenomena, we studied
the community structure of the network and its evolution from one year to another,
applying the Group Evolution Discovery method.
The results show that a strategic pattern is present in the recruitment policy of
terrorist groups in all the variables under consideration, with the only exception of
the one referring to working conditions. Moreover, this pattern is stronger the longer
are the periods in which these groups survive, unless the survival of the group itself
is under pressure.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the literature; Section 3.3
introduces the methodologies used for constructing the network and for analysing
the hypothesis; Section 3.4 presents the results of the logit specification and Section
3.5 analyses the structure evolution of the network. The last section concludes.
3.2 Literature
As pointed out in the previous chapter of this thesis, studies concerning terror-
ism have been performed in several di erent areas, such as sociology, psychology,
criminology and economics, with a greater focus on quantitative analysis. Di erent
empirical works have been proposed in the economic literature (Lai, 2007; Freytag
et al., 2011) with a main focus on macro data e global impact.
Literature suggests that the use of network analysis to understand criminal be-
haviour is an important tool to better understand the phenomena (Sparrow, 1991;
Ballester et al., 2006; Morselli, 2003; Mastrobuoni, 2015). Thanks to the e ort of
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creating a new micro dataset, this approach can be applied in order to understand
the dynamics of a terrorist network evolution, taking into consideration also the fun-
damental variable of time.
This work refers to the economic literature on empirical models of network for-
mation. From a theoretical point of view, starting from the beginning of 2000, schol-
ars tried to solve the problem of multiple equilibria with di erent strategies: some
have tried to model the network formation by the use of potential games (Jackson
and Watts, 2001); others used subnetworks as unit of analysis (Chandrasekhar and
Jackson (2014)) or considered the network formation as a game with imperfect infor-
mation (Leung (2015)). Some of the recent works used the observable implications of
homophily in order to understand network dynamics (Boucher (2015)) or combining
them with strategic and random networks features (Mele (2017)).
Even if the empirical literature on network formation is quite new, an important
branch of this literature focuses on the concept of homophily as tool for explaining
the dynamics of a social network. In fact, several existing papers clearly identify
homophily as a driving factor of the network formation process (Christakis et al.
(2010); Currarini et al. (2009); Franz et al. (2010)).
Moreover, the dynamic behaviour of communities is a growing part of the social
network literature. Several works focus on the use of graph techniques in order to
capture changes in the topological properties (Leskovec et al., 2005); while other
scholars used the concept of groups inside the network in order to explain the evolu-
tion (Backstrom et al., 2006; Falkowski et al., 2006). Clustering algorithms, such as
k-means and agglomerative hierarchical clustering, have been proposed (Chakrabarti
et al., 2006) and event-based frameworks have been developed both without the pos-
sibility of overlap between groups (Asur et al., 2007) and with the possibility of
overlap thanks to the Clique Percolation Method (Palla et al., 2005; Derenyi et al.,
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2005; Palla et al., 2007; Bro´dka et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, in order to explain the dynamics of a social network, the concept
of homophily has been largely used in several di erent fields, including economics
starting from 1954 with the work of Lazarsfeld & Merton.
In particular, the literature highlights a strong presence of homophily in:
• Gender: same sex people tend to connect more with respect to people of
di erent gender (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; McPherson et al., 2001; Maccoby,
2002; Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Onnela et al., 2014; Laniado et al., 2016);
• Ethnicity: people who share same culture tend to be more prone to bond with
each other (Schneider et al., 1997; Kalmijn, 1998; Currarini et al., 2009; Bisin
et al., 2016);
• Age: people tend to connect more with an other people of same age or gener-
ation (Fischer, 1982; Blau et al., 1991; de Mart´ı and Zenou, 2010; Carrington,
2015);
• Education: it is shown that also education is one of the factors that unifies
people (Marsden, 1987; Louch, 2000; Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Skopek et al.,
2011; Reitz et al., 2014);
• Occupation: people tend to form groups with people doing the same type of
work (Kalmijn, 1998; McPherson et al., 2001; Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Block
and Grund, 2014).
Several of these pieces of information are contained in the dataset under analysis,
consequently the goal of this work is to understand if these typical patterns high-
lighted by the literature are present also in this specific setting and if homophily is
one of the criteria that terrorist groups follow in order to recruit new people.
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3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 The network
In order to analyse this specific evolution of the terrorist network, it is important to
clarify how the network structure is constructed.
Following the line of reasoning presented in the previous chapter of the thesis,
we started from some theoretical assumptions in line with historical evidences and
we detected the direct connections based on three variables in the database: the
terrorist group, the region of militancy and the period between the entrance date
in the group and arrest date. In details we defined the connections as follows: two
individuals are linked if:
1. They operate in the same group during the same period or;
2. They belong to di erent groups of the same area but they operate in the same
region of militancy in the same period.
This insight is due to the numerous depositions given by terrorists after their
arrest in which they highlighted the importance of coordination at national level and
the continuous flows of individuals between di erent Italian areas while the organi-
zation of an important action was in plan.
3.3.2 Temporal Social Network
For the purpose of this part of the paper, it is important to understand what is a
Temporal Social Network and what are the possible evolutions of a group.
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Although in the previous chapter of this thesis time has not been kept into ac-
count by the metrics, it is a key element for the analysis of the dynamics of the
group. Literature has identified this type of networks as ”Temporal Social Network”
(TSN).
In details, a TSN is a series of time windows T, each of which represents a single
social network of edges and vertices. Following the definition of Bro´dka et al. (2013),
a Temporary Social Network is defined as follows:
TSN =< T1,T2, ...,Tn > n œN
Ti = SNi(Vi,Ei), i= 1,2...n
Ei =< x,y >: x,y œ Vi, i= 1,2...n
Where SN is a social network with a set of V vertices and a set of E directed
edges.
In order to reach the goal of this analysis, we considered each TSN as not inde-
pendent from the previous: it represents the network in a specific period of time,
which includes the connections established in the previous periods. Formally:
Ti+1 = Ti+SNi+1(Vi+1,Ei+1), i= 1,2...n
The motivation of this choice is linked to the peculiarity of the phenomenon un-
der analysis: as pointed out in the previous chapter of the thesis, terrorist networks
are characterised by the persistence of impacts of the connections even when one of
the nodes is removed from the network itself. In fact, even if one of the individuals
is captured by the police, and consequently removed from the network, the risk that
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Figure 3.1: Temporal Social Network
the person confesses and indicates one of the other free terrorists to the authorities
increases the danger for the other individuals connected, implying a persistence of
this edge inside the group. For this reason, it is reasonable to think that in order
to involve new people terrorists take into consideration also these type of connections.
In details, we took into consideration the period between 1969- 1981 which repre-
sents, according to the previous points, the period in which a lot of movement have
been registered inside the network. We created 13 TSN each of them includes the
full history of previous time windows, as explained by Figure 3.1. On each of these
TSN we performed the analysis.
3.3.3 Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MR-
QAP)
In order to catch the probability of the presence of a connection between to indi-
viduals, given the socio-economic characteristics that are present in the dataset and
literature showed as factors of homophily in general settings, we used a logit speci-
fication.
The dependent variable is a dummy defined as follows:
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Ii,j =
Y_]_[1 if individual i and j are connected0 otherwise
Where i and j represent the individuals. The baseline estimating equation is:
pr(Ii,j = 1) = (–+ —1Gi,j + —2Ci,j + —3Ei,j + —4Emi,j + ‘)
where:
• Gi,j is the matrix representing the gender and the elements will take value 1 if
the two individuals share the same gender, 0 otherwise;
• Ci,j is the matrix representing the civil status and the elements will take value
1 if both the individuals are either married, single or divorced and 0 otherwise;
• Ei,j is the matrix representing the education and the elements will take value 1
if the maximum level of education reached by both individuals is either elemen-
tary school, secondary school, diploma or university degree and 0 otherwise;
• Emi,j is the matrix representing the employment condition and the elements
will take value 1 if both individuals are either students, workers, both student
and workers or unemployed and 0 otherwise;
• ‘ represents the error term.
In order to make consistent estimation, it is important to take into considera-
tion the main characteristics of this study: the peculiar unit of analysis. In fact, in
standard regression techniques the unit of analysis is represented by an individual
observation, while in social network analysis in general, and homophily studies in
particular, the unit of analysis is represented by a dyads that is represented by a
couple of individuals. This means that each individual appears more than one time
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Figure 3.2: Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure
in the analysis (she appears n-1 times) implying the absence of independence be-
tween observations and, consequently, the correlation among errors.
The solution that we adopted in order to overcome this issue is the use of the
Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MR-QAP) which substan-
tially uses permutation in order to estimate standard error (Krackhardt (1988)).
The procedure is quite simple and it is as follows.
Let’s suppose we have a standard linear regression that in standard literature
we compute with an OLS. The idea behind this procedure is that by scrambling the
data following a random procedure which reassign the dependent variable to new ob-
servations, no relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates should
be present.
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Given that our unit of analysis is not a unique individual but dyads, the pro-
cedure needs not only to permute the rows of the matrix but also to permute the
its column in the same way. Therefore, by running the regression we obtain a point
under the null hypothesis; by continuing this type of procedure for a number of times
we generate the distribution of correlation coe cients and by comparing it with the
actual coe cient it is possible to consistently estimate the p-value of the regression.
Figure 3.2 shows graphically this procedure.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Krackhardt E/I Ratio
In order to have a first hint on the homophily in the terrorist network we calculated
the Krackhardt E/I Ratio in each of the identified TSN.
The Krackhardt E/I Ratio measures the relative density of internal connections
within a group who shares the same characteristics compared to the number of
connections that the group has to the external world. Formally it is defined as
follows:
EI = EL≠ IL
EL+ IL
Where EL are the number of links that each individual has with other individ-
uals not belonging to the same group while IL is the number of links shared with
individuals of the same group.
For lack of space, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 present the results for the four
covariates only for two representative TSN, namely the network representing the
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Figure 3.3: EI index - 1969-1972
period 1969-1972 and the network representing the period 1969-1981. For each E-
I index, a permutation test is performed to see whether the network E-I index is
significantly higher or lower than expected.
The index ranges from 1 (strong heterophily) to -1 (strong homophily) while the
p-value indicates if the result obtained is statistically significant or not. According
to these results the gender and civil status variables present a negative coe cient in
both the analysed periods, indicating a tendency to homophily during all the periods.
Indeed the coe cient obtained are not statistically significant, not allowing to reach
clear conclusions. The same consideration, in the opposite direction, can be made
for the education variable: in this case the presence of heterophily is registered in
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Figure 3.4: EI index - 1969-1981
both periods but the p-value suggests no significance.
The only significant variable is the one linked to the employment conditions. The E-I
index of the network reflecting the 1969-1972 period is not significant, while the E-I
index of the network reflecting the 1969-1981 period is slightly negative, suggesting
presence of homophily. This result is acceptable at a 10 % level (p-value= 0.069) and
suggests a plausible evolution in the strategy of recruitment by the terrorist group.
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3.4.2 General analysis
Starting from this consideration we compute the baseline regression as presented in
section 3.3. The results are showed in Table 3.1.
Each column represents a consecutive temporal social network in which the de-
pendent matrix is run on general matrices of the covariates. Positive coe cients
indicate that people tend to connect to other people with the same characteristic
(homophily), while negative coe cients suggest the opposite (heterophily). Due to
the few number of people involved in the firsts years under analysis, we present the
results starting from the 4th temporal social network (namely the network covering
the period 1969-1974) which is the first network with an important amount of nodes.
The first explanatory variable studies the homophily based on gender, namely if
terrorists tend to connect with people of the same gender. The analysis highlights a
peculiar behaviour from this specific type of individuals: the more we add an year
under analysis, the more negative and significant the coe cient becomes, suggesting
a strong and significant presence of heterophily for gender. This means that if a
man enters in a terrorist group the probability that he forms links with women is
grater than the probability that his links are with men. These results highlight a
behaviour which di ers from the usual social behaviour. In fact, as pointed out in
the literature section, it suggests that people are more prone to connect with people
of the same gender. These results suggest a precise choice by the terrorist group in
the recruitment of new people, especially when the group is present on the territory
since several years.
Focusing on the second explanatory variable, a similar analysis can be made for
the civil status. With respect to the previous point, this variable is negative and
substantially significant since the birth of the network under analysis. Even if the
heterogeneity inside the group is not high with the vast majority of the individuals
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that are not married, this element di ers from the standard literature, suggesting
again a precise choice of recruitment.
Also education seems to be an element taken into consideration in the recruit-
ment. In fact, the third row of Table 3.1 highlights a change in the behaviour inside
the group. During the first years the variable is positive and slightly significant;
while the more the network survives the more the coe cients tend to go in the op-
posite direction. Also in this case, the evolution from a situation of homophily to
a situation of heterophily points to a strategic choice of the group in the recruitment.
The only variable that is in line with the standard literature is the one related to
the homophily based on social classes. In fact, this variable is substantially positive
and significant through all over the periods under analysis even if the coe cients
tend to reduce, indicating an attention also on this aspect. The reason for which this
element is the only one which stays in line with the literature can be linked to the
nature of the phenomena and the consequent rules on recruitment: the largest part of
the connections are made in the work environment, making natural to involve people
with a more similar social class than the other variables under analysis. Taking into
consideration this peculiarity, the decrease of the coe cient through the time can be
interpreted as a further confirmation of the strategic behaviour of the group.
3.4.3 Educational and working conditions
In order to understand whether di erent levels of education and di erent type of
working conditions have the same e ects on homophily inside the group, we propose
a di erent regression. We divided both the matrix referring to educational level and
to working conditions in all the potential sub-matrices. The results are presented in
Table 3.2 and 3.3 respectively, starting from the network referring to 1969-1972 as
in the previous section.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1969-1972
1969-1973
1969-1974
1969-1975
1969-1976
Elem
entary
school
0.550 úúú
0.947 úúú
0.392 úúú
0.0851
0.131 úú
(5.96)
(10.20)
(6.19)
(1.60)
(3.13)
Secondary
school
0.0305
-0.0481
-0.00842
-0.0514
-0.0150
(0.43)
(-0.71)
(-0.18)
(-1.34)
(-0.52)
D
iplom
a
-0.134
-0.0197
0.00433
0.0430
0.0336
(-1.92)
(-0.30)
(0.09)
(1.11)
(1.16)
University
degree
0.147
0.0743
0.137 ú
-0.0356
-0.121 úúú
(1.85)
(1.01)
(2.55)
(-0.85)
(-3.85)
Covariates
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
N
3540
4032
9120
14042
25760
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
1969-1977
1969-1978
1969-1979
1969-1980
1969-1981
Elem
entary
school
0.0308
0.275 úúú
0.378 úúú
0.308 úúú
0.418 úúú
(0.86)
(8.82)
(13.72)
(11.71)
(15.64)
Secondary
school
-0.206 úúú
-0.0145
-0.0142
-0.0492 úú
-0.0998 úúú
(-8.80)
(-0.76)
(-0.87)
(-3.22)
(-6.69)
D
iplom
a
0.0232
-0.0113
0.00872
-0.00266
0.0305 ú
(0.99)
(-0.60)
(0.54)
(-0.17)
(2.05)
University
degree
0.00437
-0.0464 ú
-0.0941 úúú
-0.0941 úúú
-0.118 úúú
(0.17)
(-2.31)
(-5.43)
(-5.84)
(-7.47)
Covariates
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
N
42642
64770
90300
104652
113232
tstatisticsin
parentheses
ú
p
<
0.05, úú
p
<
0.01, úúú
p
<
0.001
Table
3.2:M
R-Q
AP
education
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According to Table 3.2, in general terms we notice that the greater is the level
of education, the greater is the level of heterophily inside the group. In fact, the
lowest level of education, which is elementary school, involve a strong and significant
homophily which persists all over the period, suggesting that people with less educa-
tional background tend to bond together with respect to people who have a higher
level of education (the coe cient associated to individuals with an university degree
is strongly negative). This is in line with the idea that terrorists tend to act more
in a strategic way. In fact, the cleverest people tend to act against the standard
procedure in social networks, probably in order to hide themselves better.
Results highlighted in Table 3.3 substantially confirm what we found in the base-
line version of the regression: students and unemployed people tend to bond with
people of the same social class, while workers seem not to follow any specific pattern.
In fact, even if they are not always significant, coe cients reflecting the behaviour of
unemployed people and students tend to be positive, underlying a tendency to ho-
mophily. On the contrary, workers seem not to have a specific pattern: coe cients
persist around zero for all the years under analysis and they are never significant.
These results are not surprising, given that recruitment by terrorist groups was
mostly made through word of mouth in firms and schools among colleagues. This
specific aspect implies that for the largest part of the individuals, work places or
attended schools are the starting point for entering the group. Moreover, the type of
occupation of each individual a ects the amount of time that it is possible to dedi-
cate to illegal activities: unemployed people have more time with respect to students
and even more with respect to workers. Therefore, the presence of homophily in this
setting is almost inevitable.
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3.5 Evolution of the group
In order to have a more comprehensive interpretation of the results, it is important
to have an idea about the internal structure of the group and the evolution it faces
during the period under analysis.
3.5.1 Community structure
Literature on complex networks suggests that networks tend to present group of
nodes with dense internal connections and sparse connections between groups. The
presence of these characteristics identifies the so called ”communities” which can be
defined as a set of nodes who more frequently collaborate with each other rather
than with other members of the population. The study of such a type of groups can
highlight peculiar characteristics that help to understand how a network works and,
consequently, how nodes a ect each other. In this precise context, the existence of
communities a ects the spreading of the risk to be caught when one of the nodes is
removed from the network. In fact, the higher is the number of communities, which
implies a more disperse network, the safer is the position of each node inside the
network.
In order to find communities inside the network, we applied the Fast Modular-
ity Optimization method also called Louvain method (Blondel et al., 2008). The
algorithm is based on the concept of modularity proposed by Newman and Girvan
(2004), which is formally defined as follows:
M =
kÿ
i=1
(cii≠ a2i )
where cii is the percentage of existing connections in a given module i and ai is
the percentage of connection with at least one end in module i.
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This value ranges from -1 to 1: the closer it is to 1, the higher is the level of
modularity. Therefore, if one module presents a value close to 1 it means that it
contains more edges within the module with respect to what we would expect if
these connections were allocated by chance.
The Louvain method is based on the iterative repetition of two steps: first, it op-
timizes modularity locally trying to detect small communities; second, it aggregates
nodes of the same community and it creates a new network taking as nodes these
communities. This process stops when the maximum level of modularity is reached.
The detailed procedure is reported in the Appendix 3.7.1.
Table 3.4 reports the number of communities detected by the Louvain method.
Period of analysis Communities
1969-1972 3
1969-1973 3
1969-1974 3
1969-1975 4
1969-1976 4
1969-1977 5
1969-1978 3
1969-1979 3
1969-1980 3
1969-1981 3
Table 3.4: Number of communities based on Louvain method
108
Chapter 3. Homophily in Terrorist Networks
According to the table, the number of communities inside the network grew con-
stantly until the period 1969-1977. These numbers suggest a period of strong evolu-
tion, in which the new nodes of the network tend to collaborate with people already
present in the groups, maintaining their di erent identity at the same time.
Starting from the period 1969-1978 there is a sharp decline in the number of com-
munities, returning to the initial values. In this period authorities started to react
against terrorism as pointed out in the previous chapter of this work. In fact, it is the
period in which police took strong actions against the most known terrorist groups
and, at the same time, the most striking attacks occurred (such as, for example, the
kidnap of the Onorevole Moro, among others).
These results are in line with what we found in the analysis of the previous sec-
tion. Although Table 3.3 presents a clear pattern in the homophily structure of the
network, it presents some important jumps in the coe cient, especially as regards the
period 1969-1976 and period 1969-1978. The analysis of communities gives a partial
explanation: this is a period of major structural change in the network, which is re-
flected in recruitment choices. Given the results of the Louvain method, the strategic
path seems to be even more evident: the stronger is the response of the government,
the more di cult is for the group to be organised in communities. Consequently, the
recruitment policy becomes more strict and strategic, making harder for the police
to detect the nodes.
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3.5.2 Group Evolution Discovery
In order to have a further confirmation of the network evolution, we applied the so
called ”Group evolution discovery method” (GED method) to our network (Bro´dka
et al., 2013).
The GED procedure is a methodology which is useful to identify the dynamics of
social groups. It takes into consideration not only the quantity of the people involved
in the network, but also the quality of the people itself. In fact, the peculiarity of
this methodology with respect to other techniques, is the presence of both aspects
in a single measure, thanks to the concept of centrality inside the formula. In order
to be consistent to what we presented in the previous part of this work, we decided
to use the Bonachich power centrality as measure of centrality .
This procedure is based on a measure called ”Inclusion” which is formally repre-
sented as follows:
I(Gi,Gj) =
| GiuGj |
| Gi | ·
q
xœ(Gi
u
Gj)BGi(x)q
xœ(Gi)BGi(x)
Where i and j represent the first and the second group under analysis and BGi(x)
is the value of the Bonachich centrality index.
The first part of the inclusion index takes into consideration the quantity of the
elements inside the network while the second part of the formula takes into consid-
eration the quality of the edges inside the group.
The determination of the evolution is explained by Figure 3.5.
The detailed calculation is reported in Appendix 3.7.2.
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Figure 3.5: Procedure for the Group Evolution Method - Bro´dka et al (2011)
According to the authors it is possible to identify six possible evolutions of the
group:
1. Stagnation: Two groups are identical or di er by few nodes in two consecutive
time frames;
2. Shrinking: The group becomes smaller in the second time frame;
3. Growing: The group becomes bigger in the second time frame;
4. Splitting: Some groups from the second time window consist of members of
one group from the first time window;
5. Merging: Some groups from the first time window form an unique group in the
second time window.
6. Dissolving: A group ends its life and does not occur in the next time window
at all.
Given the goal of the analysis, which is to understand the global evolution of
the network from t to t+1, we applied the method considering independent Tem-
poral Social Network. In details, opposite to what we did in the previous sections,
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we recreated a snapshot of the social network in each time window, not considering
people that are not in the field in that precise moment, as shown in Figure 3.6. We
considered each TSN as a unique group.
The values of – and — thresholds are fixed following the literature. According to
Bro´dka et al. (2013) these values should be at minimum 50%, which guarantees that
at least a half of the people in the starting group are included in the second group.
The maximum value of the threshold should be 100%, meaning that the first group
matches perfectly the group in t+1.
Given the peculiarity of the network under consideration, which is characterised
by a strong level of risk for the actors and an higher probability of being removed
from the network with respect to standard social networks, we decided to put this
threshold at 75%. This choice reflects the idea that maintaining three quarters of
the same individuals can be likely considered as a success for a terrorist group. The
results are presented in the Table 3.5.
Periods Threshold Values Group sizes Type of event
– — – — G1 G2
1972-1973 75 75 67,37 81,71 55 46 Shrinking
1973-1974 75 75 95,26 41,20 46 77 Growing
1974-1975 75 75 57,00 55,85 77 81 Dissolving
1975-1976 75 75 50,17 30,71 81 97 Dissolving
1976-1977 75 75 76,74 42,40 97 131 Growing
1977-1978 75 75 84,28 49,51 131 165 Growing
1978-1979 75 75 75,39 54,99 165 187 Growing
1979-1980 75 75 63,88 75,45 187 172 Shrinking
1980-1981 75 75 44,13 82,85 172 121 Shrinking
Table 3.5: Results of GED computation
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Figure 3.6: Temporal Social Network in GED procedure
With respect to the results shown by the analysis of the community structure
made in the previous section, the GED procedure suggests a more complex situa-
tion. In fact, even if the group size is increasing from one year to another, the first
years under analysis are characterised by the loss of the most central people in the
network implying a impoverishment of the quality of the group and, consequently, a
period of dissolving with the exception of the period between 1973-1974.
These results help to read the homophily evolution reported in Table 3.1 of previ-
ous section. In fact, although the direction of the homophily structure is clear in the
period under analysis, some jumps in the coe cients are present. By comparing the
two tables together, it is possible to highlight how changes in the strategic pattern
of terrorist groups correspond to the periods in which the network changes from a
situation of dissolving to a situation of growing, namely 1974 and 1977. This aspect
confirms that the recruitment policy by terrorist organizations tends to be strategic,
unless the di culties of the survival of the group are so strong that any type of new
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connection is considered and accepted.
3.6 Conclusion
The phenomenon of terrorism is one of the most discussed problems of the recent
years, with impacts on several di erent elements of the society. Despite in the last
years scholars talk about ”transnational terrorism”, some western countries, such as
Italy, had to face internal political attacks since the mid of the sixties.
The surprising period of survival of these political internal groups, with huge dif-
ficulties from government to combat the phenomena, suggests a plausible strategic
behaviour of these groups for their evolution. In fact, terrorist networks represent
a peculiar type of social groups given the illicit nature of their constitution. One of
the possible explanations of their survival can be linked to clever decisions of which
type of people include in the network; indeed behaving in an opposite direction with
respect to the natural way identified by the social network literature can help to
disorient the Government and to make investigation more di cult.
Thanks to the exploitation of a new dataset with micro data on individuals pre-
sented in the previous chapters of this work, this paper presents the first analysis of
the choices of recruitment of a terrorist network during time, using the tools of the
network analysis and, in particular, the concept of homophily. This work in based
on the four characteristics that literature highlights as typically characterized by ho-
mophily inside a social group (Gender, Civil status, Educational level and Working
conditions) and tests the concepts in the terrorist network.
We recreated the network as suggested by historical evidence and, given that the
units of analysis are dyads and not single elements, we performed the analysis using
the Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MR-QAP) which allows
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to correctly estimate standard errors.
The main results highlight the strategic path that this type of groups follow in
recruiting new people.
Although the presence of some jumps in the coe cients, the analysis suggests that
the longer the group lasts in the field, the more the choices become strategic, es-
pecially with respect to gender and education. In fact, di erently from the general
result suggested by literature, terrorists tend to bond more with people of di erent
gender and a di erent level of education. The focus on this last characteristic allows
us to understand that this peculiarity is stronger the higher is the level of education
reached by the person under analysis.
Moreover, taking into consideration the nature of the phenomenon which is born
inside the work environment, even if the homophily based on the working conditions
is the only variable that is in line with standard literature of social network. The
magnitude and the evolution of coe cients suggest a path in line with the strategic
behaviour highlighted by the other variables.
In order to provide an explanation to the jumps highlighted in the homophily
study, we analysed the evolution of the network studying both the community struc-
ture and the group evolution from one year to the other. The analysis suggests a
strong change in the internal structure especially in two periods, which correspond to
the shifts in the homophily structure. These results confirm the idea that, in general,
the recruitment policy of terrorist groups takes into consideration the importance of
hiding. It means that groups involve people with di erent characteristics in relation
to the one already present in the network, unless the survival of the group itself is
under pressure; a that point the strategic approach is partially abandoned.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Louvain method
The Louvain algorithm is as follows (Zygmunt et al., 2012):
1. Assign each node in a separate group.
2. For each vertex remove it from its group, put it in another group (Gy) of its
neighbour y separately for each neighbour y and calculate their modularity
increase. At this point, place the neighbour x in the group for which the
modularity increase is the highest. If modularity increase is not positive for all
neighbours y than node x stays in its original group.
3. Repeat step 2 until the modularity stops its growth.
4. Construct a new network by using as nodes the super-nodes created in the
previous points. The super-nodes are connected if at least one vertex in the
two super-nodes are connected.
5. Repeat until a maximum of modularity is achieved.
3.7.2 GED method
The GED method is as follows (Bro´dka et al., 2013):
1. For each pair of groups < G1,G2 > in consecutive time frames Ti and Ti+1
compute the inclusion inclusion measure I(G1,G2) and I(G2,G1).
2. Based on both inclusions I(G1,G2), I(G2,G1) and sizes one of these events can
be identified:
• Continuing: I(G1,G2)Ø – and I(G2,G2)Ø — and |G1| = |G2|;
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• Shrinking: I(G1,G2)Ø – and I(G2,G1)Ø — and |G1| > |G2| OR I(G1,G2)<
– and I(G2,G1)Ø — and |G1| > |G2| and there is only one match (match-
ing event) between G2 and all groups in the previous time window Ti;
• Growing: I(G1,G2)Ø – and I(G2,G1)Ø — and |G1| < |G2| OR I(G1,G2)Ø
– and I(G2,G1)< — and |G1|Æ |G2| and there is only one match (match-
ing event) between G1 and all groups in the next time window Ti+1;
• Splitting: I(G1,G2) < – and I(G2,G1) Ø — and |G1| Ø |G2| and there is
more than one match (matching event) between G2 and all groups in the
previous time window Ti;
• Merging: I(G1,G2) Ø – and I(G2,G1) < — and |G1| Æ |G2| and there is
more than one match (matching event) between G1 and all groups in the
next time window Ti+1;
• Dissolving: for G1 in Ti and each group G2 in Ti+1 I(G1,G2)< 10% and
I(G2,G1)< 10%
• Forming: for G2 in Ti+1 and each group G1 in Ti I(G1,G2) < 10% and
I(G2,G1)< 10%
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